| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
British operations in Helmand province, Afghanistan, have been contextualised within the theory and practice of counter-insurgency. The theories of Sir Robert Thompson are held to represent the basis for successful counter-insurgency campaigning. This analysis takes the simple premise of posing the question as to whether British conduct in Helmand between 2006 and 2008 has represented the effective utilisation of Thompson's principles. Evaluating the evolution of British operations on the ground this analysis suggests that while the influence of Thompson's thinking can be clearly detected, in practice the implementation of his precepts have been undermined and negated by a variety of factors, most notably the weaknesses of the government of Afghanistan. The result has been an ever-greater focus on the prosecution of the military campaign to the exclusion of the multifaceted programme advocated by Thompson. In conclusion, it may be contended the campaign in Helmand does not resemble the ideals outlined by Thompson or, indeed, much of an effective counter-insurgency plan.
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