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LOCAL PUBLIC
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1
ID:
147369
Bargaining over local public good provision in nested social dilemmas: a comparative study of variation from South India
/ Müller, Ulrike; Chaliganti, Raghu
Müller, Ulrike
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
In rural India, decentralized government schemes and assembly constituency development programs represent major channels through which local public good provision is realized. This polycentric governance structure confronts local leaders with a distributional conflict, which is nested in a social dilemma situation. Based on a controlled case study approach, we investigate the provision of small-scale infrastructure in three South Indian communities. Apart from roads and drinking water facilities that directly appeal to the residents of a community, local leaders bargain over infrastructure contracts, which serve as patronage resources in interactions with politicians from higher government levels. A comparative game-theoretic analysis of the results suggests that coordination through political party identities has translated into alternative bargaining strategies and hence varying distributional outcomes regarding contracts and local public goods in the communities under review. The study concludes with recommendations for polycentric institutional design.
Key Words
Bargaining
;
Social Dilemmas
;
South India
;
Local Public
;
Good Provision
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2
ID:
097017
Direct democracy and local public goods: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia
/ Olken, Benjamin A
Olken, Benjamin A
Journal Article
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Publication
2010.
Summary/Abstract
This article presents an experiment in which 49 Indonesian villages were randomly assigned to choose development projects through either representative-based meetings or direct election-based plebiscites. Plebiscites resulted in dramatically higher satisfaction among villagers, increased knowledge about the project, greater perceived benefits, and higher reported willingness to contribute. Changing the political mechanism had much smaller effects on the actual projects selected, with some evidence that plebiscites resulted in projects chosen by women being located in poorer areas. The results suggest that direct participation in political decision making can substantially increase satisfaction and legitimacy.
Key Words
Indonesia
;
Village
;
Political Structure
;
Local Public
;
Iran - Democracy - 1941-1953
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