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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
097096
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ever since the conventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan turned into irregular conflicts, both students of war and practitioners have furiously debated counterinsurgency's logic, goals, and chances of success.1 Counterinsurgency doctrine, however, has experienced no radical change since its original development. It was originally, though not systematically, formulated in the twentieth century by none other than the British officer, T.E. Lawrence, and later extended, on the basis of the writings of Mao, by a variety of counterrevolutionary strategists such as the French theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire. Even the new counterinsurgency doctrine devised by General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan does not represent a fundamental shift away from its traditional understanding, which sees this type of conflict as a contest for the support and control of population and, in turn, places the security of the populace at the hub of military operations.
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| 2 |
ID:
111221
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Moshe Dayan was Israel's most influential and original soldier. He shaped the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) culture first as chief of staff in the 1956 campaign and later as defense minister during both the conventional wars of 1967 and 1973. However, before, between, and during these large conventional engagements, the IDF conducted 'Current Security Operations,' small military operations against Arab insurgency. After 1967, the IDF faced the challenge of controlling the population in West Bank and Gaza. Moshe Dayan was instrumental in setting the policy toward the population from the foundation of the IDF to the crucial time after 1967; his ideas on and practices in counterinsurgency form a tradition in themselves. Dayan's attitude toward the population developed first under the mentorship years of Charles Orde Wingate, the British Army, and the Palmach (the Jewish strike units) during the British mandate in Palestine; then the reprisals period in the early 1950s, subsequently as a reporter and an observer in Vietnam in 1966, and finally in the 'open bridges policy,' developed by Dayan immediately after the Six-Day War.
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| 3 |
ID:
108729
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2011.
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| Description |
xxiv, 231p.
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| Standard Number |
9788191014259
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056381 | 303.690954/KAN 056381 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
110304
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do governments know whether they're winning or losing a military campaign? This question is devilish enough to answer in the context of conventional wars with pitched battles, let alone the ebb and flow of a long-term counter-insurgency. There is considerable confusion both over what sort of indicators - 'military metrics' - might be useful, and over how they should be used. Although reams of data are currently being collected and reported in Afghanistan and other conflict zones, for example, it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions about what, if any, progress is being made.
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| 5 |
ID:
176969
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| 6 |
ID:
119348
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