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| 1 |
ID:
100945
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The American call for commercial shippers to rely upon private security companies (PSCs) to protect their vessels from Somali pirates presents several challenges to sea users. Though this call for responsibilization inherently reveals state limitations, not all commercial shippers embrace it because it upsets traditional conceptions regarding order at sea. Also, the call's American origins suggest that the United States Navy may not work to ensure freedom of navigation in the last resort despite longstanding practice and the expectations of sea users. This, in turn, underscores the lack of structure in relations amongst states, shippers, and PSCs, which could have detrimental consequences regarding the management of violence at sea. The United States Navy may cease working to ensure freedom of navigation in the last resort despite longstanding practice and the expectations. While greater utilization of PSCs might seem to be an effective alternative and European states might add substance to the American call, perhaps through the Montreux Document, European activism is likely to be tempered by the different approaches towards private security that vary from country to country. PSC activism may affect the ability of navies to perform roles beyond the protection of commercial shipping.
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| 2 |
ID:
114376
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| 3 |
ID:
097174
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| 4 |
ID:
115406
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| 5 |
ID:
123667
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
West Africa piracy is the most profitable in the world. Well-organized gangs steal refined oil in contrast to Somali pirates who hold crews and ships for ransom. Like piracy elsewhere, the origins and potential solutions to West African piracy are found ashore-largely in Nigeria. This article argues that oil states in the developing world are shielded from the domestic and international pressures that can bring down their non-oil neighbors. The current international system which makes international recognition, not internal legitimacy or functionality, the key to state authority works to their benefit. It encourages those parts which are valuable to industrialized powers-and to the domestic elites who facilitate and benefit from international legitimization-to function well enough for resource extraction to continue. The security of the state generally matters less than the security of key enclaves- including ships and offshore platforms-which support elite interests.
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| 6 |
ID:
111711
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| 7 |
ID:
129230
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
H ARGEISA, Somalia - Mowlid Ahmed Abidoon stands quietly in the small prison cell where he has lived for nearly two years. Slot windows on one wall let in only a little sunlight, leaving his face almost entirely obscured in darkness. Yet there are splashes of color all around: The room's bunk beds are covered in sheets with bright floral and geometric patterns, over which hang canopies of blue mosquito nets -- cells within the cell. Clad in a striped polo shirt and prison-uniform pants, Mowlid estimates that he is about 20 years old; the last traces of baby fat still cling to his cheeks. He insists that he shouldn't be behind bars. "I'm a fisherman, not a pirate," he says flatly, as though he has delivered this speech a hundred times before. Court documents from Seychelles say otherwise. On Dec. 6, 2009, Mowlid and a band of fellow Somali pirates used firearms and explosives to attack the Topaz, a Seychelles Coast Guard patrol vessel. (Seychelles, an island nation, is about 825 miles southeast of Mogadishu, Somalia's coastal capital.) They were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 24 years in prison.
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| 8 |
ID:
114374
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| 9 |
ID:
112014
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