| Summary/Abstract |
During much of the Cold War, New Delhi’s strategic perceptions remained overwhelmingly land-centric. Maritime thinking and significance of naval power took a secondary spot in the Indian strategic and security perception. A surge in the country’s economy and post-9/11 developments rapidly transformed the country’s strategic culture. New Delhi placed a renewed focus on naval modernisation, while maritime thinking (strategy and doctrinal growth), as well as blue water naval ambitions, became pronounced. Indian Navy’s role changed from mere coastal defence to power projection, at least in documents. This study analyses the burgeoning shift in Indian Navy’s ambitions and maritime doctrinal growth in the backdrop of a new geographical construct, i.e., ‘the Indo-Pacific’. It argues that although the force envisions itself as a key enabler of maritime power projection, there is a critical mismatch between the stated objectives and demonstrated maritime military potential. This is evident from several major accidents over the past few years and post-Pulwama standoff, which practically validated the void in Indian Navy’s stated doctrinal philosophy and real combat potential.
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