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| 1 |
ID:
097304
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| 2 |
ID:
097309
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| 3 |
ID:
097306
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| 4 |
ID:
097320
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The participation of the Indian navy in anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast is perceived by many as a manifestation of India's apparent willingness to take on a larger role on the global stage. This article explores the possibility for India to play a more important role in solving the Somali piracy crisis. While recognising the limits and short-term impact of the military response, the author argues for the continuation of intervention by foreign navies in the region, the necessity for international consensus on how to deal with the pirates and the implementation of a land-based military response aimed at destroying the pirates' networks. The latter would have for their main objective not to eliminate the threat posed by Somali pirates but to lower its impact. Nevertheless, the author warns against the potential consequences of using military raids and air strikes to counter piracy. In that context, and as a major proponent of the principles of non-intervention and respect of state sovereignty, the greatest challenge India will have to face will be a political one.
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| 5 |
ID:
097317
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed between India and Nepal in 1950 has been a subject of debate within Nepal. The issue has been regularly featured in left parties' election manifestos in Nepal and become an agenda item in bilateral talks. India has agreed to review, adjust and update the treaty while giving due recognition to the special features of the bilateral relationship. Nepal's reservations to the treaty are based on the argument that the treaty compromises Nepal's ability to pursue an independent defence and foreign policy. The article examines the relevance of the treaty and prospects of India-Nepal relations in the changing international scenario. It argues that Nepal has benefited much more than India from the treaty. However, considering changes in strategic equations in the region, India-Nepal bilateral relations must be remodelled into a strategic partnership that seeks to promote security, modernisation and prosperity.
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| 6 |
ID:
097319
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
he debate around strategic autonomy offers a conceptual framework to understand how India, as an emerging power, tries to negotiate autonomy in its security and military relationship with the United States. In the context of Indo-US rapprochement, the dynamics of power relations are not commensurate with India's will to keep an acceptable degree of autonomy. Consequently, the concept of strategic autonomy, which is a realist mutation of the traditional non-aligned posture, can be described as a set of strategies aiming to balance independence in both foreign policy and security decision-making processes with the imperative to forge close strategic ties with the US.
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| 7 |
ID:
097311
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| 8 |
ID:
097312
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| 9 |
ID:
097308
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| 10 |
ID:
097310
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| 11 |
ID:
097314
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The robustness of India's nuclear doctrine would face a severe challenge in the case of conventional military offensives into Pakistan in a future Indo-Pak conflict. Such offensives are possible in case Pakistan's nuclear threshold is taken as high and its doctrine one of 'last resort'. However, Pakistani nuclear use options may include lower order nuclear use. In light of this, it recommends that India take a serious look at the Limited War concept as well as revise its nuclear doctrine to 'flexible nuclear retaliation'. It suggests the 'Sundarji doctrine' as a possible option for the latter and recommends institution of a strategic dialogue mechanism with Pakistan to ensure nuclear conflict limitation.
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| 12 |
ID:
097305
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| 13 |
ID:
097313
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| 14 |
ID:
097315
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
oday, the situation in Afghanistan is mired with the geopolitics of regional and extra-regional players. Bringing stability to the country is a major challenge for the international community. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has the potential to play an important role, provided it is able to make some adjustments in its policy. Given its strengths and weaknesses, it is likely to focus more on economic, trade and security related issues within the Eurasian region rather than in Afghanistan. However, the geographical proximity of Afghanistan to the SCO member states, particularly, the Central Asian countries, will increasingly demand continued attention of its neighbouring countries to engage Afghanistan bilaterally. Despite the SCO's proposed commitments since 2008 to provide greater attention to the Afghan issue, it may not be able to play any significant role because of its inherent contradictions, economic limitations and greater emphasis on bilateral engagement with Afghanistan by the member countries other than a multilateral engagement. More importantly, Afghanistan's absence from the SCO and the US-NATO military presence in Afghanistan do not provide enough space for the SCO to play any meaningful role in Afghanistan.
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| 15 |
ID:
097318
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How effective was the Indian government in sending clear, coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages during 'Operation Parakram' in 2001-02? This study finds that compellence was hampered by three factors: (1) the government kept changing its demands; (2) the lack of adequate civil-military coordination; and (3) the government engaged in a dual-track policy of direct coercion of Pakistan, while simultaneously engaging the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. Ultimately, these two policy strands worked at cross-purposes to each other.
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| 16 |
ID:
097302
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| 17 |
ID:
097307
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| 18 |
ID:
097316
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that in contradiction to the conventional wisdom that the Sino-Indian rivalry is one-sided (with only India viewing China as a rival); China has always factored India in its strategic calculus. The Sino-Indian relationship is asymmetric only to the extent that while India regards China as its 'principal rival', China considers India as only one of its (many) 'strategic rivals' as opposed to the principal one. This article also analyses articles related to India published in English-language Chinese journals in recent years. The analysis shows that China has now begun to regard India as a major emerging power and an important player in the emerging strategic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region (as opposed to a mere South Asian player).
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| 19 |
ID:
097303
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