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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
114577
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the peasants in rural China, the harvest season is the occasion when several different worlds - the business world of large companies, the entrepreneurial world of middlemen, local elites and peasant households - are compressed into the same social space, thereby inducing intensive economic and social interactions and crystallizing social relations among villagers, local elites and markets. Based on ethnographic research on the autumn harvest in a township in northern China, this study sheds light on distinctive modes of market transactions across produces, and diverse interactions between markets and local institutions involving different co-ordination mechanisms, rhythms and social relationships. A more nuanced image of market transactions emerges from these observations, calling for a more refined conceptualization of markets and further research on their implications for institutional changes.
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| 2 |
ID:
122318
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do we characterize and explain the behavioral patterns of the Chinese bureaucracy amid China's great transformation over the past three decades? The prevailing "tournament competition" model presented in the literature emphasizes the role of incentive design to explain bureaucratic behaviors. We develop an alternative model of "muddling through"-characterized by a reactive response to multiple pressures, constant readjustments and a focus on short-term gains-to explain the behavioral patterns of China's intermediate government agencies. We explain the underlying multiple bureaucratic logics that induce these behavioral patterns and the institutional conditions under which such behavioral patterns prevail. We illustrate the research issues, analytical concepts and theoretical arguments, using a case study of a municipal environmental protection bureau implementing the Five-Year Plan, between 2006 and 2010.
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| 3 |
ID:
141095
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| Summary/Abstract |
Situated in an agricultural township in northern China, this study examines the rise of produce markets in rural China in the face of a chronic shortage of financial capital. Drawing on theoretical ideas in economic sociology, we explicate the mechanisms of gift exchange and credit taking and the conditions under which these mechanisms are used to mobilize financial capital and to facilitate market transactions in the absence of financial capital. We illustrate these issues and ideas using our fieldwork research on different produce markets and entrepreneurial activities.
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| 4 |
ID:
097573
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| Publication |
Stanford, Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2010.
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| Description |
xxv, 363p.
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| Standard Number |
9781931368186
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055093 | 306.0951/JEA 055093 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
176603
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drawing on insights from recent economic theories of incomplete contracts, we develop a theoretical model on authority relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy by conceptualizing the allocation of control rights in goal setting, inspections, and provision of incentives among the principal, supervisor, and agents. Variations in the allocation of these control rights give rise to different modes of governance and entail distinct behavioral implications among the parties. The proposed model provides a unified framework and a set of analytical concepts to examine different governance structures, varying authority relationships, and the specific principal-agent problems entailed in a bureaucratic setting. We will illustrate this through a case study of authority relationships and ensuing behavioral patterns in the environmental protection arena over a five-year cycle of policy implementation.
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