| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
097685
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Piracy at sea not only features prominently in the current news media, but has also
come to depict much of what analysts and decision-makers view as bad order at sea.
Although piracy represents only one threat to good order at sea, it appears to be misused
as a general term for a spectrum of maritime threats and vulnerabilities. It should be
noted, however, that bad order at sea stems from more than piracy, which occurs along
both the African east and west coasts. Closer scrutiny shows that piracy against the
shipping trade accounts for much of the threat-vulnerability interface off the coast of
Somalia. To the west, in the Gulf of Guinea, the situation is more complex and the
threat-vulnerability continuum more extended and politicised, although the salience of
piracy is lower. Nonetheless, developments in the Gulf of Guinea portray more progress
on arrangements and activities to prevent bad order at sea.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
107328
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Piracy forms part of a wider array of maritime threats and vulnerabilities that are seeping into the African security landscape. While landward peacekeeping by the United Nations (UN) and other regional organisations dominates the literature - particularly with regard to Africa - piracy has become a maritime threat that has drawn significant international attention since 2007 and has become the object of international securitisation activities. Securitisation as speech acts by interested parties articulating the threats piracy hold, communication of the threat to several audiences and calling for their support and actions, as well as responses by member states, galvanised international cooperation against piracy off the Somali coast. By 2008 the UN played a prominent role in the securitisation process by creating a more conducive operating environment against piracy through four UN Security Council resolutions. The deployment of scarce naval platforms by member states in response to the UN call for action poses the question of whether a UN maritime mission is taking shape off the Horn of Africa. However, the naval response serves both UN peace support activities in the Horn of Africa and significant national and other economic interests. It appears that the naval cooperation off the Horn does not reflect an emergent UN maritime mission in support of the Somali debacle, but the question of an emergent UN maritime mission does offer fertile ground for further research.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|