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| 1 |
ID:
097833
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
IN A secret special national intelligence estimate (SNIE) in 1960, the American intelligence community concluded that "possession of a nuclear weapon capability . . . would clearly give Israel a greater sense of security, self-confidence, and assertiveness." For almost half a century since, Israel has possessed a nuclear-weapons monopoly in the Middle East, a monopoly it has fought hard to preserve.
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| 2 |
ID:
161385
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides an overview of the relationship of two Israeli intelligence services and the media over four decades. It explores how Israel’s external and internal intelligence services have dealt with the public sphere in times of publicised crises, and analyses the main differences between the internal and external intelligence services when addressing the media.
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| 3 |
ID:
121566
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE OFFICE of the assistant to the president for national-security affairs in the West Wing of the White House is a spacious, well-lit corner room in a building where space is at a premium. It contains not only the national-security adviser's large desk but also a table for lunch discussions and other small meetings as well as a couch and easy chairs for more relaxed discussions. In April 2007, this commodious setting was the scene of a remarkable meeting. Stephen Hadley, the national-security adviser at the time, welcomed Meir Dagan, head of Israel's Mossad intelligence service, who came with a special briefing for his American host. Dagan revealed a secret nuclear reactor in the final stages of construction in the Syrian desert, developed with the help of North Korea. Knowledge of this project constituted a stunning intelligence coup for Israel.
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| 4 |
ID:
128064
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay on Ghassan Kanafani-militant, political writer and essayist, literary innovator, and preeminent Palestinian novelist-is another in what JPS hopes will become an ongoing, if occasional, series foregrounding individuals (some known, others unknown to the outside world or forgotten) who embody some dimension of the Palestinian Resistance in the early years of its existence. Several such pieces have appeared in recent issues of JPS, notably "Two Portraits in Resistance," commemorating two remarkable figures who left other lives to serve the movement, published in JPS 164, and the landmark 1996 interview with Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, published in JPS 165.
Though less of a household name than the slightly younger Darwish, Kanafani, assassinated in 1972 at age thirty-six by a Mossad bomb planted in his automobile, was known during his lifetime in almost equal measure for his political work and writings and for the novels and short stories that today constitute his enduring legacy. In this evocative remembrance of Kanafani written on the fortieth anniversary of his death, Lebanese novelist Elias Khoury treats the two strands, literary and revolutionary, as inextricably intertwined, two sides of the same coin. The piece was originally published in Arabic in JPS's sister publication, Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, no. 92, autumn 2012, and translated for JPS by Maia Tabet.
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| 5 |
ID:
116647
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent months Israel's political and defence leaders have engaged in an unprecedented and vociferous public debate about Iran's nuclear programme, and about the advisability of an Israeli strike to destroy or delay it. Meir Dagan, the former head of the secret intelligence service Mossad, called an Israeli attack, at this time, 'the stupidest thing I have ever heard of', warned that it might ignite a regional war and stated that there was still a window of some three years, while the former head of the internal security agency Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin, stated that he did 'not trust' Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's and Defense Minister Ehud Barak's 'messianic' leadership. The former chief of staff (2007-11) of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Gabi Ashkenazi, has been more restrained, but has made clear his opposition to an operation at this time, and even the current chief of staff, bound by the strictures of his office, has let it be known that he is not enthusiastic.
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| 6 |
ID:
186054
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This article contextualises the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre as an important factor in the advent of state counterterrorism strategy aimed at foreclosing the next terrorist outrage. While Mossad’s Operation Wrath of God failed to trace all culprits of the massacre, it nevertheless killed its mastermind Ali Hassan Salameh alongside scores of key PLO terrorists. This led to the effective demise of Palestinian terrorism in Europe and its return to the old modus operandi of attacking targets inside Israel. Fifty years after Munich, Israel needs to formulate an up-to-date strategy vis-à-vis Palestinian and Islamic terrorism that takes heed of the obstacles and opportunities presented by the current international system.
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