| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyzes and assesses the "Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets," which have emerged as an important instrument for crisis prevention and crisis resolution in the international financial system. The paper argues that, notwithstanding their low profile, the Principles which were jointly agreed between key sovereign debtors and their private creditors in 2004 have proved to be a useful instrument in spite of their voluntary and non-binding nature. Indeed, an increasing number of sovereign debtors and private creditors have adopted the Principles' recommendations on transparency and the timely flow of information, close dialogue, "good faith" actions, and fair treatment. The paper, taking a rational choice perspective, appraises the Principles as the product of a transnational public-private partnership as well as a soft mode of governance. Moreover, it shows how the Principles have moved somewhat along the continuum of soft law and hard law toward the latter. Finally, the paper makes the case that the Principles and their design features can provide some lessons for the current international policy debate on codes of conduct in global financial regulation.
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