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| 1 |
ID:
097900
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In plural societies, social welfare can be a terrain of political contestation, particularly when public welfare functions are underdeveloped and ethnic or religious groups provide basic social services. It is well established that such organizations favor in-group members, but under what conditions do they serve out-group communities? To address this question, the authors compare the welfare programs of the predominantly Sunni Muslim Future Movement and the Shia Muslim Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although they operate under the same institutional rules and economic contexts and boast the largest welfare programs in their respective communities, the Future Movement aims to serve a broader array of beneficiaries, including non-Sunnis, whereas Hezbollah focuses more exclusively on Shia communities. Based on analyses of an original data set of the spatial locations of welfare agencies, qualitative data from interviews with providers and beneficiaries, and case studies of areas where the two parties established and did not establish welfare agencies, the authors argue that distinct political mobilization strategies-whether electoral or nonelectoral-explain different patterns of service delivery across the two organizations.
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| 2 |
ID:
178550
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The idea of liberal international order as a world order is understood to be constituted as a result of disproportionate Anglo-American influences. This is in line with much of international relations (IR) theory, which typically characterizes the emergence of order as resulting from the diffusion or imposition of norms and institutions from the world's centers of power. This article argues otherwise, its premise being that the international order founded on sovereign equal nation-states was co-constituted as well by the influence of relatively weak actors through decentralized processes of contestation over core international norms. Drawing on international relations, history, and law, this article outlines a framework to interpret the actions and mechanisms by which supposedly weak actors shaped international order. It concisely traces the constitution of order as based on its fundamental norms and assesses the implications of the argument for the current crisis of liberal order, as well as IR theory more broadly, laying out a research agenda for the future.
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| 3 |
ID:
130959
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IN MARCH OF 2013, REPUBLICAN LEGISLATORS in North Dakota agreed to challenge Roe v. Wade by forwarding a "personhood" amendment to voters that will appear on the 2014 ballot. Such an amendment would change the state's legal definition of personhood to include unborn fetuses-a move that backers have explicitly discussed as part of a challenge to a Supreme Court decision they view as having been wrongly decided.1 The Court may pronounce itself the final arbiter of the Constitution, but Americans outside of Washington, DC do not necessarily agree.2
Such efforts by state actors to take the Constitution away from the courts mirror a recent shift in political-legal scholarship, in which court-centered accounts of constitutional interpretation and construction have been rightly condemned.3 Scholars have turned instead toward a renewed emphasis on the political contestation of non-judicial actors in enforcing the Constitution.4
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| 4 |
ID:
130960
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| Summary/Abstract |
IN MARCH OF 2013, REPUBLICAN LEGISLATORS in North Dakota agreed to challenge Roe v. Wade by forwarding a "personhood" amendment to voters that will appear on the 2014 ballot. Such an amendment would change the state's legal definition of personhood to include unborn fetuses-a move that backers have explicitly discussed as part of a challenge to a Supreme Court decision they view as having been wrongly decided.1 The Court may pronounce itself the final arbiter of the Constitution, but Americans outside of Washington, DC do not necessarily agree.2
Such efforts by state actors to take the Constitution away from the courts mirror a recent shift in political-legal scholarship, in which court-centered accounts of constitutional interpretation and construction have been rightly condemned.3 Scholars have turned instead toward a renewed emphasis on the political contestation of non-judicial actors in enforcing the Constitution
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| 5 |
ID:
138354
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| 6 |
ID:
116435
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2012.
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Reflecting a chiefly economic approach to understanding political outcomes, a burgeoning literature on post-Soviet political economy finds a strong link between privatization and political pluralism in the region. To test whether the political promise of economic liberalization and the logic of modernization that underlies it hold true, I draw on existing and original data on privatization, pluralism, and opposition movements throughout the region from early independence to the present. The data reveal a fundamentally different formulation of the relationship between economics and politics than that found in the standard causal account. Contrary to approaches that stress the "the primacy of economics" in determining political outcomes, numerous cases of post-Soviet capitalist defection to the political opposition clearly point to "the primacy of politics": the tangible ways that formal and informal institutions structure economic opportunities and ultimately impinge on individual calculations to comply with, oppose, or seek refuge from the regime.
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| 7 |
ID:
133727
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2014.
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Although research on the Chinese Internet is thriving, our understanding of its multidimensional character, its diverse forms, actors, and dynamics remains limited. This is due to a tendency to focus on technology at the expense of meaning and people, as well as a bias towards sweeping and dichotomous analytical categories, such as state vs. netizens, politics vs. entertainment, and authoritarianism vs. democracy. One of the perniciously appealing ways of sensationalizing the Chinese Internet falls under this either/or dichotomy. The seven contributions in this special issue of China Information challenge such binaries, thus deepening the critical inquiry into the multiple dimensions of the Chinese Internet. The authors show a more complex and nuanced picture of actors and contestation in Chinese digital spaces, as well as the symbolic forms and consequences of these contestations, illuminating new meanings of the political and new dimensions of digital contestation, including race, class and their interactions with the nation. Together, these articles exemplify an analytical orientation that I refer to as 'deep Internet studies'. They explore the Internet as a facet of a deep China by linking it to people's practical, perceptual, and moral experiences as well as to the contexts of institutions, politics, and policies.
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| 8 |
ID:
131998
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2014.
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Rising powers have attracted tremendous interest in international politics and theory. Yet the ways in which secondary powers strategically respond to regional changes in the distribution of power have been largely neglected. This article seeks to fill this gap by presenting a systematic comparative analysis of the different types and causes of contestation strategies undertaken by secondary powers. Empirically, it focuses on two contentious regional dyads in East and South Asia, exploring how structural, behavioral, and historical factors shape the way in which Japan and Pakistan respond, respectively, to China's and India's regional power politics. The article concludes that the explanatory power of these factors depends on the respective secondary power's particular context: in the case of Japan, China's increasingly assertive regional behavior combined with a nontransparent military buildup has invoked the most significant strategic shifts, while in the case of Pakistani contestation, an increasing threat perception in the late 1980s led to the return to a pre-1971 revisionist agenda, whereas the overt nuclearization in the late 1990s mitigated India's growing conventional superiority and enabled Islamabad to replace soft balancing with more direct means of hard balancing.
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