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| 1 |
ID:
160145
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| Summary/Abstract |
If a conflict breaks out in Asia or Europe, an adversary of the United States and its allies may believe it can conduct limited nuclear strikes and, rather than precipitate its own destruction, win the war.
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| 2 |
ID:
098048
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| 3 |
ID:
187494
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| Summary/Abstract |
According to Nina Tannenwald, the nuclear taboo is a deeply held moral norm against the first use of nuclear weapons. If the nuclear taboo is violated by a country engaging in nuclear first use, how might the taboo be preserved and nuclear restraint restored? An analysis contrasting the logic of nuclear deterrence with the logic of the nuclear taboo offers reasons why the nuclear taboo cannot be preserved if the response to nuclear first use is nuclear reprisal. Instead, the preservation of the nuclear taboo would require a combination of diplomatic, economic, and conventional military responses. Nuclear reprisal might restore nuclear deterrence, but it would also validate the role of nuclear weapons in national or alliance security policy. Taboo enforcement cannot rely on the very behaviors the taboo prohibits.
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| 4 |
ID:
151704
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| Summary/Abstract |
Deterioration in security relations as between NATO and Russia reached boiling point in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. As a result, some voices in the West look forward to the departure of Vladimir Putin from power, and others to the possible disintegration of Russia as a unitary state. However, both the departure of Putin and the collapse of Russia have a nuclear dimension. Putin has issued pointed reminders of Russia’s status as a nuclear great power, and Russian military doctrine allows for nuclear first use in the event of a conventional war with extremely high stakes. Beyond Putin, a breakup of Russia would leave political chaos in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere, inviting ambiguous command and control over formerly Russian nuclear forces.
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