| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper critically examines the Obama Administration's decision to increase the level of US forces in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban insurgency. Given the complexities of the Afghan situation, and the numerous tradeoffs associated with any US response, I turn to the a game theoretic model to capture the essence of the Administration's decision. Using the model, I argue that while the "Afghan surge" temporarily increases the probability that the Taliban will accede to Hamid Karzai's government, the surge produces a problem of moral hazard. Specifically, because Karzai recognizes that negotiation will allow the Obama Administration to exit the conflict, he has no incentive to make peace with the Taliban. Despite this, the model demonstrates that the political price Obama will pay for disengagement may deter the Administration from exiting Afghanistan, thereby giving Karzai to continue fighting the war at the expense of the United States. I conclude by using these insights to draw several policy implications for the US operation in Afghanistan.
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