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| 1 |
ID:
098262
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1987, the UK Conservative Party was re-elected promising to transform the electricity industry into a privatised competitive industry and to promote an expansion of nuclear power. Fulfilling both objectives was not possible. The nuclear plants were withdrawn from the sale and plans to build new plants were abandoned, but privatisation proceeded. In 2007, the Labour government began a new attempt to build nuclear plants to operate in the competitive electricity market, promising that no subsidies would be offered to them. By 2010, the utilities that were planning to build nuclear plants were beginning to suggest that 'support' in some form would be needed if they were to build new plants. More surprisingly, the energy regulator, Ofgem, cast doubt on whether a competitive wholesale electricity market would provide security of supply. In 1990, the UK government opted for a competitive electricity market over expanding nuclear power. Now, the option of opting for a competitive electricity market may not exist. However, this might not leave the way open for new nuclear plants. The expected cost of power from new nuclear plants is now so high that no more than one or two heavily subsidised plants will be built.
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| 2 |
ID:
098558
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1987, the UK Conservative Party was re-elected promising to transform the electricity industry into a privatised competitive industry and to promote an expansion of nuclear power. Fulfilling both objectives was not possible. The nuclear plants were withdrawn from the sale and plans to build new plants were abandoned, but privatisation proceeded. In 2007, the Labour government began a new attempt to build nuclear plants to operate in the competitive electricity market, promising that no subsidies would be offered to them. By 2010, the utilities that were planning to build nuclear plants were beginning to suggest that 'support' in some form would be needed if they were to build new plants. More surprisingly, the energy regulator, Ofgem, cast doubt on whether a competitive wholesale electricity market would provide security of supply. In 1990, the UK government opted for a competitive electricity market over expanding nuclear power. Now, the option of opting for a competitive electricity market may not exist. However, this might not leave the way open for new nuclear plants. The expected cost of power from new nuclear plants is now so high that no more than one or two heavily subsidised plants will be built.
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| 3 |
ID:
162969
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In the late 1990s, a new generation of reactor designs evolved from existing designs was touted as solving the economic problems that led to the collapse of reactor ordering after the Chernobyl disaster. It was claimed these designs would be cheap and easy to build because they would be simpler and use passive safety, modular construction and standardisation. The US and UK governments were convinced by this and launched reactor construction programmes. However, 20 years on, the claims have proved false and the US and UK programmes are in disarray. The last hope for the nuclear industry appears to be that Chinese and Russian reactor vendors, with powerful support from their governments, will take over, providing reactors that are cheap but meet the safety standards required in Europe and North America. However, these vendors and their designs are largely unproven in open markets. There is also little evidence that their reactors will be cheap, there are concerns about quality and safety culture and there are national security concerns that may deter customers. New technologies, such as radical new ones, Generation IV, and Small Modular Reactors are unproven and, at best, a long way from commercial deployment
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| 4 |
ID:
104903
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2011.
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The High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) has exerted a peculiar attraction over nuclear engineers. Despite many unsuccessful attempts over half a century to develop it as a commercial power reactor, there is still a strong belief amongst many nuclear advocates that a highly successful HTGR technology will emerge. The most recent attempt to commercialize an HTGR design, the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), was abandoned in 2010 after 12 years of effort and the expenditure of a large amount of South African public money. This article reviews this latest attempt to commercialize an HTGR design and attempts to identify which issues have led to its failure and what lessons can be learnt from this experience. It concludes that any further attempts to develop HTGRs using Pebble Bed technology should only be undertaken if there is a clear understanding of why earlier attempts have failed and a high level of confidence that earlier problems have been overcome. It argues that the PBMR project has exposed serious weaknesses in accountability mechanisms for the expenditure of South African public money.
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| 5 |
ID:
113412
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intuitively, the Fukushima disaster should have a major impact on the future of the nuclear industry. This paper argues that there are four possible answers to the question what will Fukushima change: everything because the nuclear industry cannot survive another Chernobyl; the impact will vary according to location; it is too early to determine the impact; and the nuclear industry was facing serious problems that Fukushima will do no more than exacerbate. We focus on the last answer, arguing that the new designs that were expected to be so attractive as to power a 'Nuclear Renaissance' were already failing. The promises that they would be safer, but simpler, therefore cheaper and more buildable were unachievable and the Renaissance in the West had already failed. If the nuclear industry is to have a future, it might be through a shift in locus from North America and Western Europe to China, Russia and India. However, it is not clear that these countries can avoid the techno-economic issues that have derailed the nuclear industry in the West. The prospect that the nuclear industry can be saved by a radical new generation of designs is a long way off and still a remote possibility.
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