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ID:
121037
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Economic approaches are expected to achieve environmental goals at less cost than traditional regulations, but they have yet to find widespread application. One reason is the way these tools interact with existing institutions. The federalist nature of governmental authority assigns to subnational governments much of the implementation of environmental policy and primary authority for planning the infrastructure that affects environmental outcomes. The federalist structure also interacts with the choice of economic instruments; a national emissions cap erodes the additionality of actions by subnational governments. Even the flagship application of sulfur dioxide emissions trading has been outperformed by the venerable Clean Air Act, and greenhouse gas emissions in the United States are on course to be less than they would have been if Congress had frozen emissions with a cap in 2009. The widespread application of economic tools requires a stronger political theory of how they interact with governing institutions.
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| 2 |
ID:
125816
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Implementation of new environmental regulations of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury in the U.S. electricity industry has triggered concerns about system reliability. Results from a national electricity market simulation model suggest that these regulations lead to little change in generation capacity and are unlikely to create the shock to the system that some anticipate. Large costs of investments in pollution controls are partially offset by a lower cost burden for tradable emissions allowances. The combined effects result in a 1 percent increase in national average retail electricity prices. In 2020 producers pay approximately 30 percent and consumers pay approximately 70 percent of the total costs of the regulations, which equal between $6.6 and $7.1 billion in 2020 (real 2009$). The regulation leads to substantial reductions in emissions of mercury and sulfur dioxide from the electricity sector.
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| 3 |
ID:
111401
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The EPA will issue rules regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing steam boilers and refineries in 2012. A crucial issue affecting the scope and cost of emissions reductions will be the potential introduction of flexibility in compliance, including averaging across groups of facilities. This research investigates the role of compliance flexibility for the most important of these source categories-existing coal-fired power plants-that currently account for one-third of national emissions of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas. We find a flexible standard, calibrated to achieve the same emissions reductions as a traditional(inflexible) approach, reduces the increase in electricity price by 60 percent and overall costs by two-thirds in 2020. The flexible standard also leads to substantially more investment to improve the operating efficiency of existing facilities, whereas the traditional standard leads to substantially greater retirement of existing facilities.
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| 4 |
ID:
098265
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy. Concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide, with a "safety valve" that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level. We find two significant problems, both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase. One is that most important examples of price volatility in cap-and-trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked, but instead when allowance prices collapsed. Second, a single-sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment. We illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one-sided approach.
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| 5 |
ID:
098577
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy. Concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide, with a "safety valve" that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level. We find two significant problems, both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase. One is that most important examples of price volatility in cap-and-trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked, but instead when allowance prices collapsed. Second, a single-sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment. We illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one-sided approach.
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