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| 1 |
ID:
105817
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Three types of policies that are prominent in the federal debate over addressing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States are a cap-and-trade program (CTP) on emissions, a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) for electricity production, and tax credits for renewable electricity producers. Each of these policies would have different consequences, and combinations of these policies could induce interactions yielding a whole that is not the sum of its parts. This paper utilizes the Haiku electricity market model to evaluate the economic and technology outcomes, climate benefits, and cost-effectiveness of three such policies and all possible combinations of the policies. A central finding is that the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reductions from CTP can be significantly greater than those from the other policies, even for similar levels of renewable electricity production, since of the three policies, CTP is the only one that distinguishes electricity generated by coal and natural gas. It follows that CTP is the most cost-effective among these approaches at reducing CO2 emissions. An alternative compliance payment mechanism in an RPS program could substantially affect renewables penetration, and the electricity price effects of the policies hinge partly on the regulatory structure of electricity markets, which varies across the country.
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| 2 |
ID:
125816
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Implementation of new environmental regulations of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury in the U.S. electricity industry has triggered concerns about system reliability. Results from a national electricity market simulation model suggest that these regulations lead to little change in generation capacity and are unlikely to create the shock to the system that some anticipate. Large costs of investments in pollution controls are partially offset by a lower cost burden for tradable emissions allowances. The combined effects result in a 1 percent increase in national average retail electricity prices. In 2020 producers pay approximately 30 percent and consumers pay approximately 70 percent of the total costs of the regulations, which equal between $6.6 and $7.1 billion in 2020 (real 2009$). The regulation leads to substantial reductions in emissions of mercury and sulfur dioxide from the electricity sector.
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| 3 |
ID:
098265
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy. Concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide, with a "safety valve" that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level. We find two significant problems, both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase. One is that most important examples of price volatility in cap-and-trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked, but instead when allowance prices collapsed. Second, a single-sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment. We illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one-sided approach.
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| 4 |
ID:
098577
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy. Concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide, with a "safety valve" that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level. We find two significant problems, both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase. One is that most important examples of price volatility in cap-and-trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked, but instead when allowance prices collapsed. Second, a single-sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment. We illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one-sided approach.
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