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FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS VOL: 6 NO 3 (3) answer(s).
 
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ID:   098250


Crafting a better US grand strategy in the post-September 11 wo: lessons from the early years of the cold war / Gregg, Heather S   Journal Article
Gregg, Heather S Journal Article
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Publication 2010.
Summary/Abstract This article compares the instruments of statecraft used to construct grand strategies in the early years of the Cold War-the Truman and Eisenhower administrations-with the Bush administration's grand strategy and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It argues that the Bush strategy relied heavily on the military instrument of statecraft in attempts of defeating Al-Qaeda and did not develop robust and concerted diplomatic, psychological and economic tools to undermine Al-Qaeda's ideology and influence. The early days of the Cold War hold valuable lessons for crafting an integrated grand strategy that can fight both the Al-Qaeda network and its ideology.
Key Words Grand Strategy  9/11  US  Cold War 
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2
ID:   098248


Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: why public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan / Kreps, Sarah   Journal Article
Kreps, Sarah Journal Article
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Publication 2010.
Summary/Abstract Despite the increasing popularity of fighting wars through multilateral coalitions, scholars have largely been silent on the question of how public opinion in member states affects alliance cohesion. This article assesses public opinion data for states contributing to operations in Afghanistan. It finds that despite the unpopularity of the war, leaders have largely bucked public opinion and neither reduced nor withdrawn troops from NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. Theoretical expectations about international cooperation and evidence from case studies point to elite consensus as the reason why leaders are not running for the exits in Afghanistan when their publics would prefer that they do. As the article shows, operating through a formal institution such as NATO creates systemic incentives for sustained international cooperation. The result is that elite consensus inoculates leaders from electoral punishment and gives states' commitments to Afghanistan a "stickiness" that defies negative public opinion. A formal alliance such as NATO may therefore create more policy constraints than an ad hoc coalition but also increase the costs of defection and confer a degree of staying power that is unexpected given the adverse public opinion environment.
Key Words NATO  Alliance  Public Opinion  Afghanistan 
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3
ID:   098252


Testing the biden hypotheses: leader tenure, age, and international conflict / Bak, Daehee; Palmer, Glenn   Journal Article
Palmer, Glenn Journal Article
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Publication 2010.
Summary/Abstract Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. predicted that Barack Obama would face an international challenge in his early term by foreign enemies who want to test a young leader's resolve as a chief executive just like John F. Kennedy did in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. We test this argument using the directed-leader-dyad-period data for both world leaders and the US presidents between 1875 and 2001. We find that old leaders are more likely to be a target of militarized disputes, and even more so during the early term as opposed to Biden's prediction. The impact of tenure on the likelihood of being targeted largely depends on age. We also find that old Republican US presidents are especially vulnerable to foreign challenges early in their term.
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