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| 1 |
ID:
192090
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| Summary/Abstract |
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has dramatically expanded its use of inspections (巡视). Existing scholarship largely portrays inspections as an anti-corruption mechanism. However, based on an examination of hundreds of post-inspection reports from party organs, provincial and municipal governments, central state-owned enterprises, and other institutions, this article argues that while inspections initially focused on curbing corruption, in recent years the Xi administration has used them to advance a wide range of governance objectives. Besides curbing corruption, inspections also promote organizational management reforms, improve policy implementation, support party-building measures, and monitor loyalty to the party leadership. The article’s findings help resolve a puzzle about the Xi era: how does the Xi administration simultaneously pursue both power centralization and more effective governance?
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| 2 |
ID:
098322
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Transparency in public procurement bears an immediate cost both for
government and bidders. However, it is a key element to support fundamental
principles of the public procurement system, especially competition and
integrity. The drive for transparency must therefore be tempered by making
transparent what sufficiently enables corruption control. If the level of
transparency is adequately defined, the benefits will outweigh the cost,
especially when comparing the initial cost of transparency with the potential
negative consequences of corruption.
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