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| 1 |
ID:
109926
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much is made in the security sector reform literature of the role of civil society as an overseer and monitor of the security sector, contributing to improved accountability and governance. This paper looks at how the notion of 'civil society capacity' needs to be disaggregated in order to develop meaningful strategies to assist civil society organisations to impact security sector reforms in complex, post-conflict contexts like the Democratic Republic of Congo. It draws on fieldwork conducted with 200 Congolese civil society groups that are attempting to engage in current security sector reform processes, and looks at which capacities are required to improve oversight by civil society groups.
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| 2 |
ID:
105046
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper is the first to demonstrate a viable prediction market that successfully forecasts defense acquisition cost and schedule outcomes, and to provide insights for defense executive decision-making. Already used in private industry, prediction markets can also accurately forecast outcomes and their associated risks for government programs. Using virtual money, prediction markets allow traders to 'bet' on some future outcome. This market mechanism turns out to be a relatively simple and accurate way to discover, aggregate, and communicate to a defense executive the collective market's beliefs about the likelihood of an eventual outcome of an acquisition program of interest.
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| 3 |
ID:
098364
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
These comments introduce a partial literature review of privatization as has appeared in our journal as well as four articles that represent some of the work of social scientists, military and agency personnel, private contractors, and others who participated in a forum on privatization held at St. Mary's College in Maryland in 2008. The forum is a program of their Center for the Study of Democracy and The Patuxent Partnership. The 2008 conference was entitled ''The Privatization of National Defense.
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| 4 |
ID:
181636
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper asks: to what extent can a dedicated or special committee with access to classified information empower parliaments to oversee major defence procurement decisions? These decisions often involve a mixture of political, military, economic and societal interests. Particularly after episodes of contestation or controversy, questions tend to arise about how to empower parliaments. The central argument in this paper is that being institutionally empowered and incentivised does not guarantee rigorous oversight. The availability of expertise is an oft-ignored factor in studies of parliamentary oversight. An analysis of oversight behaviour by the Belgian Federal Parliament during the acquisition of new fighter jets (2015–2018) shows that members of parliament also need to be capable of mobilising the necessary expertise in order to translate technical information in such a way that it allows them to influence decision-making, which is often executive-dominated. In this way, this paper contributes to managing expectations about the capacity of parliaments to cope with complex military problems.
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| 5 |
ID:
164404
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study introduces a new type of oversight in civil-military and executive-legislative relations: community policing. Building on principal-agent theory, this type of oversight emphasises trust rather than confrontation. To illustrate how community policing functions, the study examines how legislative oversight of military affairs operates in Belgium and New Zealand. Legislative defence committees in both countries rely on trust when overseeing the executive’s handling of defence affairs. This allows these committees to perform their oversight function at low cost in terms of time and effort, but with a high degree of access to information. Community policing therefore combines the strengths of recognised ‘police patrol’ and ‘fire alarm’ oversight, while avoiding their respective weaknesses. However, since it relies on a higher degree of trust and cooperation between the principal and agent, community policing is inherently fragile.
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