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| 1 |
ID:
098598
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Kyoto Protocol allocates tradable emission allowances (AAUs) to developed countries, but they are free to choose a set of policy instruments to comply with these targets. We compare two different policy instruments: a tax and purely domestic tradable permits, for the European Union, the US and Japan. Information on abatement costs and international permit price is imperfect and stems from nine global economic models. For a country party to the Protocol, the benefit of emission reduction is that it can sell more or has to buy less AAUs. We show that in this context, permits entail a slightly lower expected cost than a tax for the US and Japan, whereas both instruments yield an almost equal outcome for Europe. Applying Weitzman's framework (Prices vs. quantities, RES, 1974) in this context, we show the importance of the positive correlation between costs and benefits: technology shocks that lead to low abatement costs in one country generally lead to low abatement costs in other countries too, thereby leading to a low international permit price in the true-up period.
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| 2 |
ID:
098607
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Border adjustments are currently discussed to limit the possible adverse impact of climate policies on competitiveness and carbon leakage. We discuss the main choices that will have to be made if the European Union implements such a system alongside the EU ETS. Although more analysis is required on some issues, on others some design options seem clearly preferable to others. First, the import adjustment should be a requirement to surrender allowances rather than a tax. Second, the general rule to determine the amount of allowances per ton imported should be the product-specific benchmarks that the European Commission is currently elaborating for a different purpose (i.e. to determine the amount of free allowances). Third, this obligation should apply when the imported product is registered at the EU border, and not after the end of the year as is the case for domestic emitters. Fourth, the export adjustment should take the form of a rebate on the amount of allowances a domestic emitter has to surrender. Five, this rebate should equal the above-mentioned product-specific benchmarks, not the emissions of the particular exporting plant or firm. Finally, the adjustment does not have to apply to consumer products but mostly to basic products.
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| 3 |
ID:
177432
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| Summary/Abstract |
Energy demand for residential heating is targeted in France by a number of subsidy programmes (tax credits, zero-interest loans, reduced VAT, white certificates) and the carbon tax. We assess the cost-effectiveness and distributional impacts of these policies using Res-IRF, an energy-economy model that integrates relevant economic, behavioural and technological processes. We find that, without further specification of revenue recycling, the carbon tax is the most effective, yet most regressive, policy. Subsidy programmes save energy at a cost of €0.05–0.08 per lifetime discounted kilowatt-hour, or €300–800/tCO2-eq; one euro of public money spent on subsidy programmes induces €1.0–1.4 private investment in home energy retrofits. Targeting subsidies towards low-income households, who tend to live in energy inefficient dwellings, increases leverage, thus reconciling economic efficiency and equity. The public cost of subsidies – €3 billion in 2013 – is outweighed by carbon tax proceeds from 2025 onwards, were the tax rate to grow as initially planned by the government. Meeting the long-term energy saving targets set by the government however requires adjusting subsidy programmes to better address rental housing. Lastly, an order-of-magnitude discrepancy between simulated and observed numbers of zero-interest loans points to economic and psychological barriers that require further investigation.
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