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| 1 |
ID:
057966
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| Publication |
London, Harper Collins Publishers, 1994.
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| Description |
xix, 316p.: ill.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0002555441
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 036098 | 923.547/FIT 036098 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
108206
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| 3 |
ID:
106513
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| 4 |
ID:
107236
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
"The West should start planning for a post-Lukashenkist Belarus before it actually arrives. Lukashenko himself might survive, but his system will not-not all of it at least."
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| 5 |
ID:
105036
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
That scum!" Boris Yeltsin fumed. "It's a coup. We can't let them get away with it."
It was the morning of Aug. 19, 1991, and the Russian president was standing at the door of his dacha in Arkhangelskoe, a compound of small country houses outside Moscow where the top Russian government officials lived. I had raced over from my own house nearby, after a friend called from Moscow, frantic and nearly hysterical, insisting that I turn on the radio. There had been a coup; Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had been removed from power.
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| 6 |
ID:
119757
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| 7 |
ID:
108194
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| 8 |
ID:
102025
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
SINCE THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian-Russian relations have never been trouble free. After 1991, the Russian leadership headed by Boris Yeltsin assumed that sooner or later Ukraine would divide into several states.1 Whereby, until around mid-1993, the Russian establishment was more concerned with resolving Russia's domestic problems, while its foreign policy focused on relations with the U.S. and Western Europe. Harmonizing relations with the states that emerged in the Soviet Union's place was not a primary issue at first.
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| 9 |
ID:
108205
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| 10 |
ID:
109555
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AT LAST fall's Valdai Discussion Club, the annual Moscow session where Russian leaders meet with Western journalists and academics, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin made clear he would issue no apologies for his recent maneuver to reclaim the Russian presidency from his protégé, Dmitri Medvedev, and dominate his country's politics for perhaps the next dozen years. Responding to one question, he declared, "I do not need to prove anything to anyone."
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| 11 |
ID:
121559
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
AT 8:00 P.M., Moscow time, on September 21, 1993, Russian president Boris Yeltsin read out an emergency decree on national television. Blaming Russian parliamentary leaders for ignoring the will of the Russian people, Yeltsin abolished the existing constitution and disbanded every legislative assembly in Russia. Russian parliamentary leaders immediately called an emergency session and removed Yeltsin for treason. They named his vice president, Alexander Rutskoi, acting president. The Russian Constitutional Court chairman, Valery Zorkin, then appeared before Parliament and reported that a majority of the court had found Yeltsin's decree unconstitutional. Russia now had two presidents.
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| 12 |
ID:
098668
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| 13 |
ID:
110454
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia should rethink what it has inherited from the Soviet Union in nuclear matters, the role of nuclear weapons, and their relevance in the future. Furthermore, Russia should consider how it can best use to its own advantage the opportunities offered by the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and how this regime can be modified to meet the realities of the new century.
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| 14 |
ID:
108198
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| 15 |
ID:
190826
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Contra the often-held assumption that the Islamist danger has been at the forefront of Moscow’s security agenda since the Soviet–Afghan War, this article shows how different Russian decision-makers held different views of Islamism during the Tajik Civil War (1992–97). It argues that different relations to the Soviet past, especially to the Soviet–Afghan War, explain the differences in assessing Islamism in Tajikistan between the security agencies and political elites. Unlike the reformers in the Kremlin, the legacy Soviet security elites and diplomats in Russia and the neo-communist leaders in Central Asia recalled the Islamist danger from Soviet times. They emphasized it to the Kremlin who came to embrace their view as the Tajik Civil War progressed and tensions rose in Chechnya.
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| 16 |
ID:
151349
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| 17 |
ID:
100576
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