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| 1 |
ID:
098766
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The advisory function can be assessed as a fallback procedure at a time when there is a lack of cases before international courts and tribunals. Although not legally binding and having no precedential effect, Advisory Opinions are generally accepted. This paper looks into the question of the Advisory Opinions in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) system. The advisory function of the Tribunal is exercised by the Seabed Disputes Chamber within the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The first request for an advisory opinion was filed on 14 May 2010. The full Court may, however, render an advisory opinion based on other international agreements according to Article 138 of the Rules of the ITLOS. As a rule, the advisory procedure is open to international organizations only. There are neither claims nor parties involved in this procedure. The paper tries to address the legal regime relating to the Opinions.
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| 2 |
ID:
101600
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper gives an overview of the activities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2009. It provides information on the 19th Meeting of States Parties (2009), organizational developments, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and cases before it.
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| 3 |
ID:
109204
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper gives an overview of the activities of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2010. It provides information on organizational matters, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and cases before it.
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| 4 |
ID:
109199
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The functions of the President of the International Tribunal for the Law (ITLOS) of the Sea are three-dimensional: the President is a normal international judge, an organizational leader and a judicial leader in a particular case. The Presidency is a powerful one, perhaps more so than that in other international judicial bodies, and can be a platform for the "national State extension" vice-the President's possible partiality towards his or her national State-to take effect. Several antidotes or safeguards exist to combat this, including the relatively short term of office, the judicial solemn declaration and the efforts to equalize the parties by ensuring "national representation" on the Bench in a case, and the principle of separation of functions and the disqualification of the national President as President but not as Judge. However, uncertainties remain regarding the timing and scope of the application of the principle of separation of functions and disqualification of the national President. The context of the ITLOS Statute and Rules and the good administration of justice militate in favour of an early trigger point at the time when a particular case is first presented to the Tribunal and the widest scope possible for the application of the principle to cover a situation where the national State of the President is not a party but is in the same interest or substantially in the same interest as a party in a case, including the situation where, though not factually connected, the non-party national State of the President and a party share a legal position that is decisive in the case. Finally, the paper suggests that, as a further antidote, the possibility be considered of requiring a presidential solemn declaration (separate from and in addition to the judicial one) or revising the current judicial declaration to encompass presidential functions.
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