| Summary/Abstract |
Recent work demonstrates that the European state system—which, since the Middle Ages, saw the recurrent formation of balances of power—constitutes a historical exception rather than the rule among anarchic international systems. In this study, I set out to explain why Europe avoided hegemony. I argue that the character of state–society relations at the time of intensified geopolitical competition leads to different systemwide outcomes with respect to balancing and hegemony. Where multiple privileged groups already exist, rulers must negotiate with a range of societal actors to extract revenue and resources for warfare. This further entrenches institutional constraints on rulers and the privileges enjoyed by societal groups, which in turn make it difficult for rulers to convert conquest into further expansion. In the absence of preexisting multiple privileged groups, however, geopolitical competition instead further weakens the ability of societal actors to check their rulers. This dynamic creates a return-to-scale logic that facilitates systemwide conquest. My argument accounts for the diverging trajectories of, on the one hand, medieval and early modern Europe and, on the other hand, ancient China—where the state of Qin eliminated its rivals and established universal domination.
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