| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
099340
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since the very beginning of the power systems reform process, one of the key questions posed has been whether the market, of its own accord, is able to provide satisfactory security of supply at the power generation level or if some additional regulatory mechanism needs to be introduced, and in the latter case, which is the most suitable approach to tackle the problem. This matter is undoubtedly gaining importance and it has taken a key role in the energy regulators' agendas.
In this paper, we critically review and categorize the different approaches regulators can opt for to deal with the problem of guaranteeing (or at least enhancing) security of supply in a market-oriented environment. We analyze the most relevant regulatory design elements throughout an updated assessment of the broad range of international experiences, highlighting the lessons we have learned so far in a variety of contexts. Based on the analysis, we conclude by providing a set of principles and criteria that should be considered by the regulator when designing a security of supply mechanism.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
101391
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In an attempt to provide electricity generation investors with appropriate economic incentives so as to maintain quality of supply at socially optimal levels, a growing number of electricity market regulators have opted for implementing a security of supply mechanism based on long-term auctions.
In this context, the ability to analyze long-term investment dynamics is a key issue not only for market agents, but also for regulators. This paper describes a model developed to serve this purpose. A general system-dynamics-inspired methodology has been designed to be able to simulate these long-term auction mechanisms in the formats presently in place. A full-scale simulation based on the Colombian system was conducted to illustrate model capabilities.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
111071
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since the very beginning of the restructuring process, back in 1982 in Chile, the ability of an electricity market to provide the system with the required level of security of supply has been put into question. The mistrust on the ability of the market, left to its own devices, to provide sufficient generation availability when needed, is more and more leading to the implementation of additional regulatory mechanisms. This matter is undoubtedly gaining importance and it has taken a key role in the energy regulators' agendas.
In this paper, we revisit this discussion under the light of thirty years of electricity market experience. We analyze the different reasons why, although ideally the market is supposed to provide itself an adequate security of supply at the generation level, this result is still far from being achieved in practice.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|