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ID:
099710
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Obama administration's reset policy with Russia focuses on certain key issues in the Russo-American relationship: arms control, as embodied in the new Prague treaty called New Start, gaining Russian support for U.S. pressure on Iran, and gaining Russian support for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. This article closely examines the arms control and Iranian issues as well as the broader issue of Russo-American rivalry over Eurasian security, perhaps the core issue in the relationship and certainly the most contentious one there. The analysis suggests that there are numerous problems with the treaty that go beyond the issue of whether or not it allows the U.S. to build missile defenses. It also suggests that there are unproven and even unjustified assumptions about Russian policy regarding Iran and regional security that reduce the real value and prospective gains of this policy for the U.S.
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| 2 |
ID:
099711
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Central Asia, the collective Central Asian states that were a part of the former Soviet Union, is a land not well known to many peoples of the West, or East for that matter. A land of mystery perhaps, but it is also a land of strategic importance for both the West and the East. Situated between Europe and the Far East Asia, the states there have been invaded, conquered, and occupied by several different empires over the centuries. This article addresses Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, their strategic importance, their relationship with China, and the strategic implications of that relationship for Russia and the United States. There is a potential for either wide conflict or cooperation among the three great powers in this region. So far, the pivot appears to be China. Driven by its demand for energy, among other things, China has staked a claim in the three Central Asian states that border it.
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| 3 |
ID:
099709
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| 4 |
ID:
099708
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A limited resumption of nuclear testing is needed for effective nuclear deterrence. Nuclear testing is necessary to maintain an acceptable level of confidence in the current U.S. stockpile, enable modifications of legacy nuclear weapons that may be required to meet emerging stockpile requirements, support a prudent nuclear arms reduction program, and confirm by actual demonstration that we have the nuclear weapons design and manufacturing skills we think we have.
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