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BANK PERFORMANCE (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   099912


Cooperation satisfaction and performance: empirical evidence from Chinese banks and their foreign strategic investors / Lu, Chin-Hwa; Shen, Chung-Hua; Wu, Meng-Wen; Wu, Zhi-Wen   Journal Article
Shen, Chung-Hua Journal Article
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Publication 2010.
Summary/Abstract In this paper, we investigate whether the mutual satisfaction of Chinese banks and foreign strategic investors (FSI) in terms of their cooperation with each other affects the performance of Chinese banks. Since 2004, China's banking authority has conducted an annual survey on Chinese banks and their FSI, assessing levels of mutual satisfaction in terms of their cooperation. We use these survey results to examine the effects of satisfaction levels on the profitability of Chinese banks. Our results reveal that satisfaction affects profitability; that is, satisfied foreign investors and Chinese banks yield better performance. Satisfaction determinants for each party are also examined. Although the profitability of Chinese banks does not show a significant effect on the satisfaction of either party, bank loan to deposit ratios, regions of FSI home countries, and the type of Chinese banks are important factors that might affect satisfaction.
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2
ID:   167813


Motivations for Loan Herding by Chinese Banks and Its Impact on Bank Performance / Fang, Hao   Journal Article
Fang, Hao Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract This study uses a dynamic herding model that considers intertemporal and cross‐sectional correlation to confirm that loan herding occurs among joint‐stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). We clarify the motivations for bank loan herding. We find that loan herding by both JSCBs and CCBs results more from following the behavior of other same‐type banks than different‐type banks because of characteristic herding or reputational concerns. Loan herding by JSCBs is motivated by investigative herding, whereas loan herding by CCBs results from informational cascades. Moreover, loan herding has a significantly harmful impact on the operating performance of CCBs but not JSCBs, which may be explained by the irrational behavior of CCBs. Our results will help Chinese bank supervisors develop appropriate policies for handling loan herding.
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