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| 1 |
ID:
192438
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| Summary/Abstract |
DURING the Ukraine conflict, one thing has become very clear: Russia's enemies are barbarically destroying what others have created, as if to avenge their own worthlessness and weakness. It is just like the old Chinese proverb: "The weak take revenge, the strong forgive...." Russia's enemies are destroying vital assets, dooming devastated areas to environmental disaster. The blowing up of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, the Togliatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline, the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant - They are unable to deal with the Russian Army and are retaliating against the civilians of Europe, Ukraine, and Russia in their powerless rage. This hysterical behavior is psychologically abnormal. Not even the Nazis during World War II thought to blow up the Dnepr Hydropower Plant; and yet, the Kiev authorities are destroying critical infrastructure on their own territory like real occupiers.
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| 2 |
ID:
100153
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Periodic contestations over gas transit from Russia westwards to Europe, as in January 2009, have demonstrated the fractured nature of relations among states that each on their own plays a vital role in the maintenance of the European energy sector. More importantly, the January crisis has reinforced the concept that energy security goes beyond existing conceptions of access to upstream supply balanced by consumer demand. Up to now, the track record along the European energy value chain has prioritised short-term macro-solutions over longer term, step by step confidence building micro approaches. What becomes of energy trade in Europe may depend upon a fundamental re-thinking of energy based both on the understanding of the good as a purely economic commodity and on our institutional ability to coordinate the energy trade as a collective across a vast landscape of divergent economic and political interests. Subsequently, this article seeks to identify the sources of inaccurate structural interpretations of the policy environment, the unintended consequences derived from sub-optimal policy choices and to present workable solutions to existing risks to the stability of EU/Russia energy trade.
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| 3 |
ID:
137284
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE GAS CONFLICT that broke out between Russia and Ukraine in the wake of the February 2014 coup in Kiev made it even more important to minimize the share of gas transported to Europe via Ukraine. The planned South Stream would be not enough to resolve the problem - the carrying capacities of the functioning gas corridors, the recently commissioned Nord Stream in the first place, which bypass Ukraine, should be increased.
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