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| 1 |
ID:
032547
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| Publication |
London, I B Truris & Co Ltd, 1986.
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| Description |
xv, 478p.: ill., tables, mapshbk
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| Standard Number |
1850430136
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 027738 | 982.02/ROC 027738 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
128593
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author examines, with considerable personal courage and honesty, the event leading to, and the aftermath of, a blue-on-blue tragedy in the 1982 Falklands War, He draws a number of lessons, both operational and administrative, which seem to have just as much relevance today. Perhaps the final sentence is the most important one.
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| 3 |
ID:
122182
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2012.
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The UK-Argentinian dispute regarding the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands has been central to public debate in this the 30th year since the Falklands War. Less well known, however, are the strategic challenges facing the UK in managing its Overseas Territories in the region, to which the Falklands are a 'strategic gateway'. Klaus Dodds surveys the rationales underpinning current UK policy regarding the South Atlantic and Antarctic Overseas Territories - sovereignty, security and stewardship - and addresses the implications for regional geopolitics of the recent saga involving the proposed merger of the British Antarctic Survey and National Oceanography Centre.
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| 4 |
ID:
185942
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This article is based on my experience of commanding the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines during the Falklands War. It discusses the huge logistic challenge of supporting a divisional-size force over 8,000 miles from home without air resupply and without air superiority over the battlespace. This could not have been achieved without the unique organisation and teamwork of the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines. It was the key component to provide the Land Force Commander with the logistical hub of the operation known as the Beach Support Area. I conclude with some lessons from the war, which I believe remain relevant today.
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| 5 |
ID:
185945
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The genesis of this article was my relating to a fellow Falklands veteran some 39 years later the experiences of repatriating Argentine POWs, and soon after, taking up his suggestion to ‘commit to paper to add to the “Corporate memory”’. And as I look back and reflect, I see that what we faced was a unique, untried and untested situation for which there was no recent operational precedent. I am not a ‘diary person’, but my memories of these events are still sharp and vivid. And although I now realise with hindsight the challenges and potential pitfalls, at that time it was a matter of just ‘get on and sort it as best we can with what we’ve got’, and yes, with pooling joint experiences and much common military sense, we effectively ‘winged it’, soon hitting on the solution that worked. I also remember well the many debriefs from the hordes of experts that descended on the Canberra during our return voyage home – on the many and varied subjects of battle procedure, weapon and equipment performance, minor tactics, command and control and so on, but strangely, and it never occurred to me at the time, I cannot recall any debrief on POW handling, so maybe these recollections can now be added to all those other official accounts…
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| 6 |
ID:
122189
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2012.
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John Lehman was US Secretary of the Navy during the Falklands War. In this personal recollection of the war's conduct he emphasises a strong and mutually supportive Anglo-American relationship at odds with the emerging historical interpretation of the alliance between the UK and the US as one fraught with difficulties and mistrust.
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| 7 |
ID:
185943
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I kept a detailed diary throughout the Falklands campaign. When I read my Falklands diary 40 years on, I do not know the author. That person was driven, single-minded and obsessed with winning at all costs, well aware of the global and national implications of both success and failure. I also carried an 8-mm camera and filmed when I could. In 2015, I published this footage with the title, ‘Commando Engineers in the Falklands War: Version II’, unedited, except for format and subtitles, on YouTube. It was well received. On the voyage home from the conflict, on SS Canberra, I instructed my officers and soldiers to write down their experiences, which were circulated as an after-action report within the Royal Engineers. There was little debriefing on return. The implications of what we had learned were daunting and too expensive to face. We were very tired. We moved on. The focus remained on the British Army of the Rhine. I left the Army in 1993 and moved to the US, where I reside today with my family. We are all US citizens. Since retiring in 2014 after 20 years in business I revisited the Falklands Campaign as a lecturer for the US Marine Corps. Like most veterans, my memories and views have changed over time, as has my knowledge, not least from talking to Argentine veterans and learning from the US Marine Corps. This article reflects my views today on my very real experiences 40 years ago.
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| 8 |
ID:
177814
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Two examples from recent British campaigns, the first from the Falklands War of 1982 and the second from the Iraq War of 2003, are used to consider attempts by civilian policy-makers to influence the conduct of ongoing military operations as a result of frustration with slow progress. Both cases highlight the importance of the higher command structures as providing a buffer between the government and local field commanders, and show the problems that can result when key strategic questions are left unanswered in the run-up to a campaign.
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| 9 |
ID:
126360
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article reconsiders the negotiations between the United States and Britain at the outbreak of the 1982 Falklands War. The Reagan Administration did not support Britain, its staunchest NATO ally, and on the contrary assumed an even-handed position that recognised Argentina as a key ally as much as Britain. Not only did American mediation fail; it also caused a major crisis in Anglo-American relations. The underlying reason for the American decision was the obsessive importance that the Administration attached to fighting communism in Latin America after establishing covert co-operation with the Argentinian military junta in 1981.
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| 10 |
ID:
100310
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| 11 |
ID:
034847
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| Publication |
London, WeidenFeld and Nicolson, 1988.
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| Description |
vii, 248p.: ill.Hbk
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| Contents |
Includes bibliography, index.
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| Standard Number |
029779146X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 029642 | 923.2/HAR 029642 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
103919
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How effective are parliamentary democracies at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages? Are parliamentary democracies any better at doing this than presidential democracies? In order to answer these questions, the research project uses an in-depth analysis of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War as a case study. This article seeks to determine how effective the United Kingdom was at sending coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages. In general we observe that the United Kingdom suffered from many of the same problems in executing a coercive strategy as presidential governments do.
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