|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
124634
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, social democrats in Europe believed that their moment had finally arrived. After a decade in which European politics had drifted toward the market-friendly policies of the right, the crisis represented an opportunity for the political center left's champions of more effective government regulation and greater social justice to reassert themselves.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
100341
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS in Germany* and the subsequent new government coalition put once again on the agenda the future of Russo-German relations. Losing in the elections, vice chancellor Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who developed the partnership for modernization concept, left the new government together with the Social Democrats. ** Remarkably, this concept, which arose from cooperation between Russia and Germany, was proposed as the basic model for developing relations both between Russia and the EU and between Russia and other countries of Europe. The place of the SDP, historically geared to constructive cooperation with Russia, was taken by Free Democrats headed by Guido Westerwelle, who traditionally criticize Russia and its leadership. Observers had some fears about this very politician who filled the position of foreign minister (the impression right at the start of the new coalition's activities was that he could bring discord in relations between Germany and Russia).
The fears proved wrong, however. The new government's statement, unlike the statement of the previous government, had no mention of a strategic nature of the partnership and it sounded more reserved about the objectives and prospects of relations with Russia. This seems to have become even a positive factor because it put an end to needless debates about the meaning of strategic partnership. As a rule, German and European experts had opposing views of this partnership.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
139957
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Why has the right, including the populist right, rather than the left, been the main political beneficiary of the anger and bitterness that has roiled Europe since the 2008 financial crash, the eurozone crisis, and the resulting deep recession and brutal austerity? After all, these events surely proved the relevance of the left’s critique of capitalism. The crisis has been so deep and prolonged that a kind of social disintegration has been taking place, at least in the Southern cone, without precedent in postwar Europe. (In Spain, youth unemployment is more than 55 percent.) More: the crisis has been managed largely to the benefit of the already well-off, in a spectacularly brazen fashion. The trillions that were handed over to banks too big to fail are now being gouged out of citizens too weak to resist. (This intensely political class strategy is called “austerity.”) The recovery, such as it is, is benefitting almost exclusively the already affluent, as catalogued in Danny Dorling’s cry of moral outrage, Inequality and the 1%. It is a recovery of McJobs, zero-hour contracts, and food banks. One UK charity alone, the Trussell Trust, has handed out 913,000 food parcels in the last year, up from 347,000 the year before.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|