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| 1 |
ID:
174776
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has expanded considerably over the last decade. This growing presence has led to significant debates about China’s goals and capabilities in the region. This article argues that China’s trajectory over the last ten years reflects an alignment of ends, ways and means in the Indian Ocean. The main driver behind China’s ambitions in the region is the need for Beijing to secure pivotal maritime lines of communications that carry a large share of Chinese oil imports and a sizable part of Chinese exports. Fulfilling this mission has required a significant adjustment of China’s naval strategy, and the addition of ‘open seas protection’ to the core missions of the PLA Navy. This strategy has, in turn, been supported by the development of a navy with increased sea control capabilities and overseas basing plans that have started to materialize in Djibouti.
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| 2 |
ID:
149074
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| Publication |
Surrey, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013.
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| Description |
xv, 217p.: tableshbk
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| Series |
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series
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| Standard Number |
9781409451846
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058868 | 359.030951/LIM 058868 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
107943
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rapid development of Chinese naval forces over the last decade has provoked much debate over where this modernization is headed. Observing the decennial evolution of Chinese naval forces, this article questions assumptions that China's naval modernization can be mainly explained by the enduring salience of the Taiwan question or by a "Mahanian" impulse. In the last ten years, China has prioritized the development of its submarine fleet and its sea-denial capacity, a choice that can be explained essentially by Beijing's position in the East Asian regional system and the disquieting presence of an adversarial global power.
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| 4 |
ID:
151425
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| Summary/Abstract |
Among the multiple dimensions of the tous azimuths modernisation of Chinese naval forces, the development of China’s anti-access capacity has recently elicited considerable interest. The important link between this capacity and an overarching vision of the use of force – i.e. a naval doctrine – has, however, often been left implicit. This article shows that the particular development of China’s naval anti-access forces – more precisely, forces with an impact on the naval balance – can be explained by a shift of China’s naval doctrine towards a distinctly pre-emptive posture, which, itself, stems from the set of constraints imposed by the framework of ‘local war under informationised conditions’.
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| 5 |
ID:
188349
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| Summary/Abstract |
The last decade has witnessed the gradual erosion of the maritime status quo in East Asia, as the United States proved unable to curb Chinese challenges in the East and South China seas. This article argues that this phenomenon is linked to the erosion of US general deterrence posture in the region. It examines the three main factors that have contributed to this erosion: an enduring imbalance of interests between Beijing and Washington, a rapidly evolving local balance of power, and the employment by China of strategies that have allowed it to efficiently circumvent US weak red lines.
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| 6 |
ID:
161509
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The 2016 Taiwanese elections which saw a sweeping victory of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have revived the question of cross-Strait instability. While observers have generally focus on whether or not the Tsai administration could cross Beijing’s red lines, few have taken into consideration the dynamic nature of these red lines, and how Ma’s presidency had impacted them. This article fills this gap by drawing on prospect theory hypotheses to assess the shift of Beijing’s preferences in the Taiwan Strait. It explains that Ma’s accommodative policy have left a paradoxical legacy as China is likely to be today more risk-acceptant on a comparatively wider range of cross-Strait outcomes, making cross-Strait relations more crisis-prone than they have ever been.
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| 7 |
ID:
137455
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| Summary/Abstract |
The uninterrupted rise of China, concomitant with the progressive erosion of the US unipolar moment, has generated increased interest for the (Power Transition Theory) PTT in the last decade. Observers and scholars have, however, often focused on the possible overtaking of the United States by China, and overlooked the importance of the challenger's ‘satisfaction’ in the PTT. This article fills this gap by providing an assessment of China's satisfaction with the contemporary East Asian ‘status quo’. Contrary to recent assessments depicting China as a ‘status quo’ actor, the use of the main three indicators developed by the PTT suggests that China is a strongly dissatisfied power.
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| 8 |
ID:
100350
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2010.
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In charting the water of the post-Cold War world, one of the most prominent questions touches upon the likely effects of China's rise. Echoing more or less explicitly power transition theory's assumptions, the rapid and multifaceted ascent of China has popularized the idea of a likely overtaking of the American dominant power by the rising challenger. Sceptics have, however, pointed out that by most standards China remains far from being on a par with the United States. This paper argues that though a global power transition lies far beyond the horizon, the relevant level at which the transition should be considered is the East Asian region, or the Asian 'super-region'.
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| 9 |
ID:
109481
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