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| 1 |
ID:
132165
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush decided to retire almost all the tactical nuclear weapons operated by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. His reasons were simple: these short-range weapons were militarily useless and imposed significant burdens on the armed forces in terms of money, manpower, and time. Twenty-three years later, only one type of tactical nuclear weapon remains in the U.S. inventory: the B-61 gravity bomb. In addition to the several hundred B-61s located at home, the United States currently deploys around 180 of them in Europe, at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. In the event of a nuclear conflict on the continent, NATO would deliver the bombs via U.S.-built F-15 or F-16 aircraft or European-built Tornado fighters, operated by some combination of Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and U.S. crews. Originally intended to prevent Soviet forces from penetrating Western Europe, the planes could travel as far east as Russia. But owing to their slower speed and lower altitude, they would be much more vulnerable to Russia's ground-based air defenses than would longer-range strategic bombers and missiles.
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| 2 |
ID:
150203
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| 3 |
ID:
150232
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| 4 |
ID:
139323
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| Summary/Abstract |
The very human consequences of the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea have dominated recent headlines, as the number attempting the treacherous crossing from Africa to Europe has significantly increased in tandem with the minor improvement in conditions at sea. The question of how to tackle this problem has also featured prominently on the EU agenda, given that its current border-patrol mission, Operation Triton, was not designed to respond to the humanitarian challenges posed by the phenomenon. In this article, Alessio Patalano considers the lessons that can be drawn from Triton’s predecessor, Operation Mare Nostrum, a year-long effort led by the Italian navy to rescue migrants, which came to an end in October 2014.
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| 5 |
ID:
123478
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| 6 |
ID:
100373
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| 7 |
ID:
190992
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article tells the extraordinary story of Fiorenzo Capriotti, the man behind the sinking of the Egyptian flagship the Emir Farouk in October 1948 and the birth of the Israeli navy commando unit. Using the same unconventional technique that the Italian navy special assault unit Decima Flottiglia MAS had pioneered against the British in World War II, the embryonic Israeli navy was able to defeat Egypt’s superior numbers and weaponry. Not only did Capriotti play a key role in the founding of the Israeli navy commando unit, but he also made a significant contribution in shaping the doctrine that the Israeli navy should overcome the unfavourable balance of power through the superiority of its naval commando units. The sinking of Emir Farouk in fact consolidated the notion that the Israeli navy should compensate for its small size relative to most of its enemies through greater agility and firepower.
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