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ID:
152942
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay examines and evaluates China’s global rise and the state of the transatlantic discussions about this issue. Since 2010, the rise of China has been accompanied by multiple Chinese initiatives on the international front, especially in the fields of trade and investment. Chinese overseas direct investments are on the rise at a global level. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, of the Silk Road Fund, and of the “Belt and Road” initiative are signs of a much more assertive China that is now engaging Western countries, including Europe and the USA. Western reactions, both at governmental and grass-root levels have been mixed. Two questions emerge: can Europeans agree on a common policy toward China? And can the USA and the European Union pursue a dialog and a more coordinated strategy? This will be especially relevant in the context of President Donald Trump’s administration as well as newly elected governments in France and Germany following general elections in these countries in 2017. The future of a transatlantic dialog should also encompass the British question when the UK leaves the EU. As the USA and leading European countries map their foreign policy strategies in coming years, there is a need to elevate policy coordination toward China in the hierarchy of political and economic goals. The paper offers some suggestions on possible priorities.
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| 2 |
ID:
190173
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the European Union’s (EU) policy in Central Asia has been its continuity. Although the EU has recently revised its strategy for the region, Brussels’ priorities saw little change both thematically and in terms of approach. This article argues that two mutually reinforcing factors help explain the continuity of the EU’s Central Asia policy. First, the sui generis nature of the EU means the decision-making system is both complex and decentralized. The multitude of veto actors serves to make the status quo more realistic. Furthermore, the EU leadership is immune from the incentives and pressures of domestic political competition, an essential factor in the foreign policymaking of national leaders. The compounding factor is Central Asia’s peripherality for Brussels. The region is distant geographically and marginal economically. As a result, continuing existing approaches and commitments remains the least costly and most feasible policy option.
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| 3 |
ID:
112793
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| Publication |
Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
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| Description |
viii, 215p.
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| Standard Number |
9780230285279
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056613 | 341.247/ARI 056613 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
116211
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| 5 |
ID:
115975
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Business Standard Books, 2010.
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| Description |
186p.
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| Standard Number |
9789380740010
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056927 | 327.54/KUM 056927 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
128974
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The basic question this paper asks is how the domestic instability in China will affect external action.
China's society is undergoing a major change along with its economic growth, with various social
contradictions deepening, including gaps between the rich and the poor. These social contradictions
occasionally erupted in riots and demonstrations. Scholars have argued what sorts of external action
these developments would lead to, on which there are two camps of thought: (i) expansion, and (ii)
compromises. The problem is that for what reasons and through what mechanisms the domestic
instability would lead to external actions have not yet been fully clarified. Domestic instability does
not necessarily always influence external actions in all countries. There should be some conditions
in order for domestic instability to influence external actions. This paper argues that the intervening
variable that links domestic issues to external policy is the stability of the political system. From this
perspective, the current instability of China's political system is only limited and the likelihood that
domestic problems should be diverted to its external policy is not so high at the present stage. For
the moment at least, China is not in a situation where domestic instability would lead to hard-line
external policy, as suggested by diversionary theory. That is because the extent to which domestic
problems in China can make the political system itself unstable is limited. Meanwhile, regarding
the claim that China cannot compromise on external policy under the watchful eyes of the domestic
elite or society as a whole, as suggested by audience cost theory, there is both supporting and
negating evidence at present.
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| 7 |
ID:
129397
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| 8 |
ID:
100411
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