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HARVEY, COLE J (3) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   100430


Beyond missile defence: alternative means to address Iran's ballistic missile threat / Pomper, Miles A; Harvey, Cole J   Journal Article
Pomper, Miles A Journal Article
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Publication 2010.
Key Words Missile Defence  Ballistic Missile  Iran  Missile Threat 
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2
ID:   187665


Can Courts in Nondemocracies Deter Election Fraud? De Jure Judicial Independence, Political Competition, and Election Integrity / Harvey, Cole J   Journal Article
Harvey, Cole J Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Many nondemocracies hold multiparty elections while also adopting institutions of de jure judicial independence; yet there is debate over how nondemocratic courts can affect election integrity. This paper argues that increased de jure independence creates incentives for opposition recourse to the courts, which reduces election fraud due to greater legal exposure for election-manipulating agents and the ruling party. However, this effect occurs only when competition is low and the ruling party has limited incentive to intervene. These predictions are distinct from those of prior work, and they are supported by an analysis of cross-national election-year data from 1945 to 2014. Preprocessing techniques are used to reduce concerns about endogeneity and confounding. The results show that principal-agent dynamics can occur in manipulated elections even when incumbents remain in office, challenge the centrality of protest risk as a deterrent to manipulation, and offer a framework for predicting when de jure reforms translate to behavioral independence.
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3
ID:   172242


Principal–agent dynamics and electoral manipulation: local risks, patronage and tactical variation in Russian elections, 2003–2012 / Harvey, Cole J   Journal Article
Harvey, Cole J Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Why are some elections manipulated more severely than others, and why do the techniques used to manipulate them vary over time and space? This article addresses these related questions by showing that patronage resources—not incumbent popularity—make manipulation appealing to frontline agents, while local political conditions can make manipulation personally risky for them. Agents can mitigate these risks by adopting more dispersed forms of manipulation like vote-buying, rather than more centralised falsification. These hypotheses are tested using forensic analysis of electoral data from more than 90,000 precincts per election across Russia’s 83 regions, from 2003 to 2012.
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