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| 1 |
ID:
136649
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses the question of why regional cooperation among Afghanistan’s neighbours has been so difficult despite these countries’ common concerns. To answer this question, Afghanistan is conceptualised as placed at the core of overlapping regions: South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and, through China’s influence, East Asia. Over the past decade, interactions among different regions ‘through’ Afghanistan have increased, and overlap has intensified. Each of these regions is characterised by more or less intense balance-of-power security dynamics, which have played out in Afghanistan. The fact that the regions that overlap in Afghanistan are predominantly characterised by patterns of conflict helps to explain the difficulties of regional cooperation
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| 2 |
ID:
136663
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The growing international influence of so-called emerging powers has had a major impact on global governance, leading to new challenges for established and emerging powers alike. This contribution outlines the expectations of established powers and the debates on the state of global governance in the field of International Relations, as well as the positions and policies of emerging powers. An analysis of the fields of TRADE and climate policy highlights the resilience of established powers and reveals that emerging powers, despite their declared reluctance, have actively participated in global governance to pursue their interests. While cooperation is difficult, confrontation is not inevitable.
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| 3 |
ID:
133163
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The year 2014 will prove crucial for Afghanistan. The presidential elections will shape the country's political future, both who will govern and how much the process of democratic consolidation will have advanced. On the military front, by the end of the year, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission is expected to withdraw all combat troops from the country. While the United States and other Western countries are planning to stay engaged in Afghanistan after 2014 through the presence of training and counterterrorism forces, in late 2013 and early 2014 the difficulties in finalizing a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghan governments led to calls for a "zero option"-a complete departure of all foreign troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, leaving the country alone to manage its security, train its armed forces, and fight extremist groups.
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| 4 |
ID:
113880
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on India's relationship with Sri Lanka in examining why a regional power failed to manage a conflict in its immediate neighborhood. Historical and domestic factors help explain India's largely hands-off policy (1991-2006). In contrast, regional and international factors underpin its support of Colombo's military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, including New Delhi's concerns about China.
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| 5 |
ID:
168872
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| Summary/Abstract |
As populists have formed governments all over the world, it becomes imperative to study the consequences of the rise of populism for International Relations. Yet, systematic academic analyses of the international impact of populist government formation are still missing, and political commentators tend to draw conclusions from few cases of right-wing populism in the Global North. But populism – conceptualised as a ‘thin’ ideology based on anti-elitism and anti-pluralism – takes different shapes across world regions as populists combine it with different ‘thick’ ideologies. To reflect such diversity and gain more systematic insights into the global implications of populism, we focus on cases of populist government formation in the Global South. We find that populists in power are not, per se, more belligerent or less willing to engage globally than their non-populist predecessors. Factors like status seeking or a country's embeddedness in international institutions mitigate the impact of populism. Its most immediate effect concerns procedural aspects: foreign policymaking becomes more centralised and personalised – yet, not entirely unpredictable, given the importance of ‘thick’ ideologies espoused by populist parties and leaders. Rather than changing course entirely, populists in power reinforce existing trends, especially a tendency towards diversifying international partnerships.
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| 6 |
ID:
135273
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite a tense security situation, the uncertainties related to withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the increased activities of its competitors (Pakistan and China), India has not substantially stepped up its security governance engagement in Afghanistan. In this article, I explain India's hesitant policy as a factor of domestic-level threat assessments, international pressures, and the risk-averse character of Indian foreign policy.
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| 7 |
ID:
100469
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2010.
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Regional powers are often conceived of as 'regional leading powers', states which adopt a cooperative and benevolent attitude in their international relations with their neighbours. The article argues that regional powers can follow a much wider range of foreign policy strategies in their region. Three ideal-typical regional strategies are identified: empire, hegemony, and leadership. The article is devoted to a theory-led distinction and clarification of these three terms, which are often used interchangeably in the field of International Relations. According to the goals pursued, to the means employed, and to other discriminating features such as the degree of legitimation and the type of self-representation by the dominant state, the article outlines the essential traits of imperial, hegemonic, and leading strategies and identifies sub-types for better classifying hegemony and leadership.
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| 8 |
ID:
163362
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Rising powers have often been characterised as ‘reluctant’ when it comes to their contributions to global governance. However, also within their regions they have sometimes pursued indecisive, muddling-through policies, including in the field of security. This paper addresses the puzzling issue of rising powers’ reluctant approach to regional crisis management. It conceptualises reluctance as entailing the two constitutive dimensions of hesitation and recalcitrance, and it seeks to approach a theorisation of reluctance that focuses on a combination of international expectations and domestic preference formation. The empirical analysis addresses instances of regional crisis management by the democratic rising powers India and Brazil during phases of domestic political stability under the Modi (2014–2018) and the Lula (2003–2011) governments, respectively. The analysis of India’s crisis management efforts in Afghanistan and Nepal, and of Brazil’s leadership of the MINUSTAH mission and its approach to the civil war in Colombia, reveal that reluctance emerges if a government is faced with (competing) expectations articulated by international actors as well as with a range of domestic factors that lead to unclear preference formation.
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| 9 |
ID:
126020
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the frequent failure of mediation efforts, the potential negative impact of this outcome on conflict dynamics in civil wars has not been systematically studied. Starting from the assumption that the failure of mediation may cause the conflict parties to conclude that non-violent strategies are ineffective, we develop a rationalist model to explain under what conditions mediation failure might lead to the escalation of violence. Shifts in the degree of negotiability of the conflict parties' goals and in the balance of their internal structure (relative strength of hardliners and moderates) are taken as explanatory variables. We test our hypotheses with a qualitative comparison of 23 cases of failed civil war mediation from around the globe. While shifting goals are rarely observed, it is shown how the strengthening of hardliners in the wake of mediation failure has significant explanatory power.
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