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ID:
113119
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| 2 |
ID:
107587
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| 3 |
ID:
100705
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
RONALD REAGAN'S SIGNATURE PHRASE "Trust but Verify" surfaced every time the arms reduction talks were discussed in the United States. The "insidious" Russians, meanwhile, opted for "Verify Before Trusting" when dealing with the Americans, the formula suggested by the sad experience of America's unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the extreme vagueness of Washington's strategic aims.
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| 4 |
ID:
173266
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| Summary/Abstract |
A REPORT on the situation analysis that was presented on May 21, 2019 at the Russian Foreign Ministry has been prepared under the direction of Sergey Karaganov with the participation of several leading Russian independent and government experts on security and arms control policy. The report is titled, "New Understanding and Ways to Strengthen Multilateral Strategic Stability." This is an interesting study that raises a very important problem - the search for new approaches in new foreign policy realities. We could argue in detail or in general, but the time has come to respond to the challenges that we are facing. As Isaac Babel wonderfully put it in his Odessa Tales, you cannot shut out the sun with your palms.
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| 5 |
ID:
164201
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE U.S.'S WITHDRAWAL from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) may prove useful - however, only if it gets normal people throughout the world and, most importantly, many of us Russians to come out of years-long hibernation. This hibernation could be described as strategic parasitism.
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| 6 |
ID:
171541
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| 7 |
ID:
123221
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides an analysis of the 'reset' policy toward Russia, which was inaugurated in 2008 by the Obama administration and soon embraced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It argues that, rather than being prompted by domestic dynamics in the United States, the 'reset' was a response to systemic pressures. More specifically, the West's relative decline on the international system, the retrenchment of expeditionary NATO, and the rise of potentially revisionist powers. Although prompting an improvement in the relationship, these pressures failed to bring about Russia's full integration into the post-Cold War Western international settlement. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, NATO's relations with Moscow experienced an initial revitalization through a resumption of the works of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the signing of a New Start Treaty between the United States and Russia in 2010, and an expansion of supply lines to Afghanistan through Russian territory. However, there was no real incentive for both sides to truly 'reset' the relationship. The alliance never treated Russia equally, preferring instead to dictate conditions. Any discussion of Russian-NATO relations was couched in this context; the 'reset' was also conceived as a small gift to Moscow. For its part, the Kremlin never accepted a junior partner status, making it clear that its preferred option remains the alliance's dissolution and the creation of a different, new pan-European organization that would incorporate the Russian Federation as a full member. The article concludes that, despite the mixed achievements of the 'reset', the alliance retains a systemic incentive to seek durable cooperation with Russia.
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| 8 |
ID:
128686
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| 9 |
ID:
192426
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| 10 |
ID:
115610
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| 11 |
ID:
103112
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