| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia's role in the Balkans waned in the post-Cold War period until President Dmitry Medvedev's Serbia visit in October 2009. The visit marked a sharp turn in Russia's approach to the region, with the new and more assertive rhetoric suggesting Russia's willingness to engage in 'infighting' the western military and energy security interests. Revived Russian interest in a new security mechanism for Europe to replace NATO, talk of establishing a Russian base in the Serbian town of Nis,and the likelihood that the entire length of the Southern Stream gas pipeline through Serbia will be guarded by the Russian Army, show that Russia is serious about countering NATO in the Balkans.
The article examines the strategic reasons for the shift in Russian policy, specifically with a focus on why it is in Russia's vital interest to prevent a future expansion of NATO. The author briefly explores the consequences of the renewed Russian strategic interest for the region on the processes of policy- and identity-formation in Southeastern Europe. He relates the specific strategic concerns that led to Russian proposal for a new security mechanism for Europe to collectively identity problems of the Balkans. Russia's attempted strategic marriage, it is argued here, with Serbia is based on of convenience. Russia's opposition to further NATO expansion is grounded in rational security concerns; yet the sparseness of Russia's genuine strategic partners in Europe makes efforts to dissipate escalation of animosities between Russia and NATO less effective. Hence the paradox: the less successful Russia is in galvanizing opposition among the small countries in Europe against further NATO enlargement, the more likely it is that its new security policy will escalate to more drastic and antagonistic postures towards NATO.
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