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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
182015
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| Summary/Abstract |
The challenges Colin Gray faced to publish a fully fleshed out analysis of the contribution made by special operations to defense and security were many. James Kiras runs through his different efforts across the year in a nearby tribute. Colin believed that the best way to understand the strategic utility of special operations was to look at it through the lens of history, and, as one who worked closely with him on his project, I would like to lay out what I believe were his most significant insights on this subject and look at what might be called his pioneering, and sadly unpublished, work on the subject: Special Operations: What Succeeds and Why.
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| 2 |
ID:
190441
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| Summary/Abstract |
Across the world, Special Operations Forces (SOFs) play a leading role in asymmetric warfare. The unique trainings, skills, weapons, and equipment of these elite Tier 1 operators, differentiates them from conventional forces, making them the preferred choice in complex environments. SOFs are ideally deployed for short operations, which include direct action missions, hostage rescue, hunting high-value targets (HVTs), mobility operations, intelligence operations, airborne operations, counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and covert operations among others. While the literature has mostly focused on the utility of major powers’ SOFs in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), with little attention on Africa’s SOF’s, this paper examines the origins, evolution, composition, and deployments of Nigeria’s SOFs specifically in the Northeast, Northcentral, and Northwest theatres of operation, against the Boko Haram insurgency and armed banditry, respectively. Drawing on primary data from interviews with key informants and other secondary data sources, the paper interrogates the successes, challenges, and prospects of Nigeria’s SOFs. The strategic utility and overreliance on Nigeria’s SOFs by political leaders and the Military’s High Command puts a strain on their strategic value which potentially undermines their strategic efficacy as a force-multiplier in the long run, against unconventional threats.
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| 3 |
ID:
100941
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have re-opened the debate about the strategic utility of special operations forces (SOF). This article follows the debate and identifies the main factors that contribute to the strategic utility of SOF in various types of conflicts. Drawing upon Israeli experiences with special operations it demonstrates that, contrary to the commonly held view that Israeli SOF have significant strategic utility, Israel is has difficulties utilizing its SOF during large-scale military campaigns, despite their impressive utility in discrete operations. The article draws inferences from the Israeli case regarding the tension between the potential for unique strategic utility of SOF and the desire to have special operations complement the general military effort. The article concludes that the geostrategic environment informs the SOF's strategic utility: the operational concept determines expected strategic utility, and the organizational setting shapes the SOF's ability to fulfil their potential utility.
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