| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the mid-1990s, almost all Western states have privatized military tasks, albeit to varying extents. The article addresses both aspects of the phenomenon: Why did Western states privatize military tasks, and why did they do so to varying extents? The neorealist argument of the market providing a competitive edge for the armed forces and liberalist 'casualty aversion' and 'cost-effectiveness' explanation both equally fail to provide a comprehensive answer for the privatization of military tasks. Alternatively, the article employs sociological institutionalism, arguing that transnational norms on conventional warfare prescribe the structure and organization of armed forces. If the content of these norms changes, states will adjust their force structure accordingly. Consequentially, states started to privatize military tasks when the requirements changed from self-sufficiency to more market reliance. However, transnational norms have to work their way through domestic norms resulting in variations. The more consistent transnational normative demands are with the domestic structure, the more extensive the former demands are implemented. The crucial domestic variable is the notion of sovereignty. If sovereignty is defined minimally market solutions are embraced and military activities are outsourced extensively. If states hold a broader understanding of sovereignty, they are reluctant to hand over military tasks to the market.
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