| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
116231
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a dynamic model in which counterterrorism policies have the potential to generate positive public support for terrorism via a backlash that may fuel terror recruitment. For an optimizing government aiming at maximizing security, this phenomenon produces a natural bound on proactive counterterror policy that is related to the dynamic path of conflict. Moreover, terror is a persistent phenomenon that requires patience on the part of the target government for optimal counterterror policies to be realized. Finally, the potential for backlash yields insights into the need for target governments to fight an information war to change public opinion regarding its own policies and the ultimate effect of terror attacks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
192045
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Cybersecurity plays a role in national security. This study introduces cybersecurity concepts in ways familiar to defense economists and identifies parallel methods of analysis in the fields. The theoretical tools of both fields include microeconomics and game theory. These tools enable analyses of phenomena present in both milieus: public goods, externalities, commons, incentives, interdependent security, platform economics, and inefficiency of decentralized decision making. Additional topics include cyber war, cyberterrorism, deterrence and disinformation in cyberspace, price of anarchy, and economics of cryptography.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
100953
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
113949
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
A dynamic model of a terrorist organization is presented with the defining feature being that a succession of operatives is recruited at different points in time. Consequently, a government's counterterror policy must be tailored according to the vintage structure of the terrorist group that it faces. This implies that past history of counterterror policy and attacks matter for the formulation of current and future policy. The authors present the necessary steps to formulate and solve a vintage model, and to deal with the delay differential equations that naturally arise from the vintage structure. The resulting analysis captures the implications of a diverse set of phenomena such as Internet recruiting, training delays for logistically complex plots, age distribution of operatives, and the sensitivity of government impatience/cabinet composition to terrorist events for the inner dynamics of terrorist organizations and counterterror policy. Directions for future research are also suggested.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|