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ID:
101121
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the gap between government ambitions and actual outcomes in the case of European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. Specifically, it investigates why Europol has not managed to live up to its tasks despite outspoken government support. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, the study suggests why bureaucrats might be motivated to resist calls for international cooperation. By examining the process by which Europol has developed as an actor in the counter terrorism field, this article shows how development in the field of intelligence cooperation is not exclusively the reflection of government preferences. It concludes by suggesting that scholars could gain greater insight from a less state centric approach to the study of intelligence. In addition, the article suggests that policy makers cultivate a greater familiarity with bureaucratic factors and that they continually work with those factors in mind.
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| 2 |
ID:
101119
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The literature on intelligence little describes or comparatively analyzes the intelligence services of insurgent groups. This article partially fills the gap by assessing the intelligence activities of FARC - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. FARC intelligence displays similarities to, as well as sharp differences from, the intelligence activities of other insurgent groups and established states. Like FARC as a whole, FARC intelligence is decentralized. Its strength is its focus on tactical military intelligence. Collection on strategic political issues, analysis, and counterintelligence are relatively weak. FARC's intelligence weaknesses limit its prospects for strategic success and its intelligence-related vulnerabilities offer the Colombian government opportunities to exploit.
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| 3 |
ID:
101120
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the content and nature of American intelligence with regard to Finland in 1941-1944. The significance of intelligence was that it supported connections between the United States and Finland at a time when both external and internal circumstances inhibited the functioning of normal state to state relations between the two nations. The evolution of wartime conditions guided the interests of American intelligence. The main conclusion is that American intelligence in Finland can be interpreted as communication on multiple levels between two states.
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| 4 |
ID:
101122
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2010.
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This article explores the development of the Kriegsmarine's signals intelligence service, the B-Dienst, and its role in operational planning prior to 1939. It challenges the prevalent view that the Kriegsmarine had little interest in intelligence gathering and contends that the naval leadership understood the implications and possibilities of this new intelligence source. By employing hitherto unused source material the article demonstrates how the B-Dienst was systematically protected and nurtured by the naval staff. Consequently the Kriegsmarine entered the Second World War with a well-prepared signals intelligence machinery from which it reaped the rewards in the first half of the conflict.
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| 5 |
ID:
101123
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US Department of Defense (DOD) has made available to scholars a significant collection of documents captured from the files of the Saddam-era Iraqi intelligence services. DOD is also studying ways in which further such documents can be released. These documents paint a picture in many ways reminiscent of the intelligence services of the totalitarian Soviet Union. These and forthcoming documents may enable important research on Iraq and on the role of intelligence services in totalitarian states. One newly available document gives the Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate's assessment of Iran on the eve of the Iran-Iraq War.
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| 6 |
ID:
101118
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