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| 1 |
ID:
175744
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| Summary/Abstract |
Policymakers often tout expanded access to education as an antidote for terrorism in Africa. Targeted economic development is also considered a necessary complement to education gains because young, well-educated individuals who lack viable opportunities are vulnerable targets of radicalization. Despite common assertions that poor socioeconomic circumstances drive radicalization, empirical research has hitherto neglected critical inquiry of these policies. Varied findings across cross-national studies of education expansion and the effects of burgeoning youth cohorts warrant a focused examination of regions plagued by the proliferation of extremist groups. This study explores the role of education in mitigating a turn to terror among youth in Africa by examining 50 countries from 1970 to 2011. Expansions in primary, secondary, and tertiary education appear to have different influences on domestic terrorism. In the sub-Saharan region, one model shows primary and secondary education reduced terrorism while others indicate non-monotonic effects in societies experiencing a youth bulge. These nuanced findings suggest education should not be relied upon to counter extremism without additional initiatives to facilitate socioeconomic opportunities. The implication of this paper’s findings are important for academics and policymakers eager to create stable polities across the African continent.
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| 2 |
ID:
101294
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Youth' is an ambivalent concept that is situationally and emically specific. This article discusses socio-demographic approaches to youth and applies the 'youth bulge' argument - which claims that a society with a high percentage of youth has an increased risk for violent conflicts - to the Central Asian context, more precisely to the early Komsomol and the former combatants in civil war Tajikistan. Based on ethnographic material, I analyse vanguard groups and their strategies for manipulating, challenging and negotiating cultural concepts of youth to mobilize young people on a large scale.
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| 3 |
ID:
158643
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article looks critically at the new global youth, peace and security agenda, that has been marked by the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 in December 2015. It argues that this agenda needs to be situated within the broader context of the securitisation of development, and that the increasing interest in youth as a security subject and actor is shaped by three overlapping sets of global security concerns: the concept of the youth bulge is a euphemism for the problem of growing surplus populations worldwide; the ideal of youth as peacebuilders is a model for eliciting youth support for the current global social and economic order; and the spectre of globally networked youth being radicalised by extremist groups has legitimated joint state and private sector projects that are taking an increasingly active role intervening in the online lives of young people around the world. The article draws on an analysis of a collection of core documents that form the heart of the global youth and security agenda; and it argues for the need for greater critical reflexivity in considering the growing attention being paid to youth as a social category in global development and policy discourse.
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| 4 |
ID:
161604
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| Summary/Abstract |
The presence of an exceptionally large youth population, that is, a youth bulge, is often associated with an elevated risk of civil conflict. In this article, we develop an instrumental variable approach in which the size of the youth cohorts in Sub-Saharan Africa is identified using variation in birth-year drought incidence. Our results show that an increase in the size of the population group aged fifteen to nineteen raises the risk of low-intensity conflict. A 1 percent increase in the size of this age-group augments the likelihood of civil conflict incidence (onset) by 2.3 (1.2) percentage points. On the other hand, we do not find any association between the size of the two adjacent youth cohorts, that is, the population groups aged ten to fourteen and twenty to twenty-four.
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