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ID:
127869
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection refused to approve a government initiated takeover in the Polish power sector and the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection did not make a ruling on that case, the takeover was finally prohibited. In this context, the main aim of this paper is to carry out a quantitative analysis of the impact of the takeover in question on electricity prices and quantities, consumer and producer surpluses, dead weight loss and emissions. The scope of the study covers the Polish power generation sector and the analysis was carried out for 2009. A game theory-based electricity market equilibrium model developed for Poland was applied. The model includes several country-specific conditions, such as a coal-based power generation fuel-mix, a large share of biomass co-combustion, etc. For the sake of clarity, only four scenarios are assumed. The paper concludes that the declared synergy savings did not compensate for the increase in dead weight loss and the transfer of surplus from consumers to producers caused by increased market power.
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| 2 |
ID:
101320
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Loree Bykerk and Ardith Maney look at how consumer protection policy fared under the conservative congresses of recent decades. They argue that although the congressional forum open to consumer protection issues remained stable, consumer advocates and their allies were significantly more outnumbered by producer interests than they were before the Republican takeover of the House in 1995
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| 3 |
ID:
110870
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2012.
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The crisis of 2007-09 was prefigured by bubbles in the housing and mortgage credit markets of major Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. A comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France reveals that, contrary to popular perception, the two European countries had a bigger housing price bubble, more volatility, and a more short-termist mortgage market. Yet, the fallout of the crisis-in terms of overindebtedness of mortgage holders, foreclosures of homes, and the extent to which the "nest-eggs" of households were devalued-has been worse in the United States. This article explores which differences in the use of credit markets for the social policy of promoting homeownership can account for this puzzling finding.
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