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ID:
101327
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During World War II the Canadian Army was a small cadre force augmented by citizen volunteers. It was a colonial institution, dependent on the British Army for doctrine and staff training. After the war, the army became involved in a lengthy struggle to define its concept of professionalism. Modernizers aimed for a well-educated officer corps that was integrated with other elites and able to influence national security policy. Traditionalists wished to preserve regimental traditions and leadership based on social class. Contention between these factions resulted in stalemate, with modern management undercut by internal politics. The result was the failure of professional norms in the 1993 Somalia operation. Subsequent reforms have put a modern "constabulary-realist" model of professionalism in place.
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| 2 |
ID:
185252
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| Summary/Abstract |
Samuel Huntington theorized in The Soldier and the State that rather than make the military in the image of society (subjective control), both superior civilian control and military outcomes would result if the military was allowed its own sphere and culture, shaped by military requirements (objective control). Since 1963, the Canadian Armed Forces have argued for objective control, while political leadership and the country have largely paid little attention to military demands for greater social independence. An examination of defense policy, the “civilianization” crisis, the Somalia Inquiry, and diversity legislation and programs demonstrate the triumph of subjective control. This article concludes that subjective control has had costs to civilians in military shirking and to the military in alienation from its parent society. Huntington remains useful, but it is time to consider modern alternatives to understand civil-military relationships.
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