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ID: 101409

Risk premiums in the German day-ahead electricity market / Viehmann, Johannes

Viehmann, Johannes	Journal Article
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Publication

2011.

Summary/Abstract

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of risk premiums in the German day-ahead Electricity Wholesale Market. We compare hourly price data of the European Energy Exchange (EEX) auction and of the continuous over-the-counter (OTC) market which takes place prior to the EEX auction. Data provided by the Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA) has been used as a snapshot of the OTC market two hours prior to the EEX auction. Ex post analysis found market participants are willing to pay both significant positive and negative premiums for hourly contracts. The largest positive premiums were paid for high demand evening peak hours on weekdays during winter months. By contrast, night hours on weekends featuring lowest demand levels display negative premiums. Additionally, ex ante analysis found a strong positive correlation between the expected tightness of the system and positive premiums. For this purpose, a tightness factor has been introduced that includes expectations of fundamental factors such as power plant availability, wind power production and demand. Hence, findings by Longstaff and Wang (2004) can be supported that power traders in liberalised markets behave like risk-averse rational economic agents.

Key Words

Electricity Market ; Risk Premium ; Spot Prices

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ID: 132754

Value of information in explicit cross-border capacity auction / Richter, Jan; Viehmann, Johannes

Viehmann, Johannes	Journal Article
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Publication

2014.

Summary/Abstract

We study two electricity markets connected by a fixed amount of cross-border capacity. The total amount of capacity is known to all electricity traders and allocated via an auction. The capacity allocated to each bidder in the auction remains private information. We assume that traders are faced with a demand function reflecting the relationship between electricity transmitted between the markets and the spot price difference. Therefore, traders act like Bayesian-Cournot oligopolists in exercising their transmission rights when presented with incomplete information about the competitors' capacities. Our analysis breaks down the welfare effect into three different components: Cournot behavior, capacity constraints, and incomplete information. We find that social welfare increases with the level of information with which traders are endowed.

Key Words

Information ; Economics ; Social Welfare ; Electricity Markets ; Incomplete Information ; Auction ;
Interconnector ; Cournot oligopoly ; Capacity constraints ; Cross-border trade

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