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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
101593
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed between the two Movements for Democratic Change and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) set the change for a new set of political dynamics in Zimbabwe. Although it has not transformed the coercive base of ZANU-PF's support, it has led to new battles for state power and changes in the strategies of the major political parties. The discussion below uses the great Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's conception of the 'passive revolution' to understand the changes in the political economy that have marked recent Zimbabwean politics, looking in particular at the different approaches of the three parties to the GPA during this period.
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| 2 |
ID:
101588
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Be robust, be tough on self-serving tyrants whose hands are dripping with the blood of their own people.' This has been the mantra chanted with quasi-religious conviction, directed at leaders of South Africa, the Southern African Community and the African Union. Proponents of this doctrine of coercive diplomacy are moved by a spirit that connects humanitarian intervention to regime change and the rights of democratic states to replace illiberal tyrants in the name of both the victims and the wider call of security for the ethically superior liberal parts of the world. This article examines the comparative utility of the approach outlined above vis-agrave-vis an approach that privileges suasion and engagement over confrontation. Serving as a representative case study for this comparison are three African countries, which have been mired in conflicts that led to untold human suffering: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Zimbabwe. The article argues that not only do proponents of coercive diplomacy fundamentally misconceive the political dynamics of the countries, region and continent in which they are seeking to intervene, but also that rather than providing an answer to the problem at hand, their tough posture is at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive. Indeed, experience in these countries, and in others such as Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa before them, challenges the universality of diplomatic approaches and assumptions that deify coercive diplomacy as a means of solving conflicts. The article concludes by elaborating on the nuances of the competing diplomatic approaches. These nuances, as well as the evidence culled from the three experiences, buttress the author's view that the people and governments of Africa share with the rest of the world a desire for a conflict-free continent and a peaceful world. As they increase their agency for bringing this result about, they require and deserve to be supported by the rest of the world.
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| 3 |
ID:
144708
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| Summary/Abstract |
The growth and survival of the field of conflict resolution can only be attained if practice is used to generate theory, rather than a reliance on the current situation where theory attempts to direct practice. Some conflict resolution practitioners believe that theory and practice cannot be separated. This article evaluates the art of mediation using Zimbabwe as a case study, where the strategy was used in an attempt to resolve the Zimbabwean conflict that began in 1999. Employing primary and secondary sources, the article delineates the major characteristics of mediation and clarifies principles of the strategy. It further establishes the affinity and dissonance between practice and theory. In addition, it asserts that in the Zimbabwean case, the achievements of insider-partial mediation as a strategy were limited. In the long term the mediation strategy failed because the Government of National Unity did not fulfil all the outstanding issues enunciated by the global political agreement as a precursor to free and fair, credible and legitimate elections. In opposition to the mediation targets towards sustainable peace, Zimbabwe witnessed rushed elections before the accomplishment of the issues at stake, leading to the overall failure of the insider-partial mediation.
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