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ID:
101621
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We argue that international organizations decrease the duration of international conflicts by mitigating commitment problems and encouraging combatants to cease hostilities more quickly. Empirical analyses of militarized interstate dispute duration (1950-2000) reveal that increasing shared international organization (IO) participation reduces the length of disputes, even after accounting for selection into international conflict. We also find that international organizations designed to mitigate commitment problems decrease dispute duration, while IOs capable of reducing information asymmetries do not influence dispute length.
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| 2 |
ID:
191251
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) systems present households with a way to reduce their energy bills, while contributing to a clean energy transition. However, rental properties are considerably less likely to have solar PV. It is unclear whether current policies that focus on reducing upfront costs to installing solar PV address the barriers perceived as most important by property investors. Using a best-worst scaling survey of 931 property investors, we find that investors on average view renters being unwilling to pay higher rents for properties with solar PV equally as important as affordability concerns as barriers to investment. Owners of apartments or townhouses focus on structural barriers. Our discrete choice experiment of 147 property investors shows that policies that spread solar system payments over time and direct feed-in tariff revenue to property investors are not preferred by most owners of fully-detached rental dwellings. We conclude by stressing the importance of policies that reduce information asymmetries from the property investor perspective regarding the value that renters place on PV systems. There is also a need for policies to better address barriers faced by owners of apartments and townhouses.
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| 3 |
ID:
143416
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper, we empirically examine how government forces vis-à-vis market forces have affected the market share of investment banks in Chinese domestic IPOs over the period 1995–2010. Before 2005, only political connections significantly positively influenced the market share of investment banks. After 2005, the effect of political connections declined, while a low evaluation standard on IPO candidates and low underwriting fees now also significantly enhance market share. We explain these findings by the pro-competitive, yet partial changes that were introduced in the regulatory framework for IPOs, thereby emphasizing the need for a delicate policy coordination in marketization reforms.
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