Query Result Set
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:1216Hits:19520028Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

  Hide Options
Sort Order Items / Page
BERNHAGEN, PATRICK (2) answer(s).
 
SrlItem
1
ID:   101623


Private provision of public goods: corporate commitments and the United Nations global compact / Bernhagen, Patrick; Mitchell, Neil J   Journal Article
Mitchell, Neil J Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2010.
Summary/Abstract We examine the commitments of transnational corporations to human rights, labor, environmental, and anti-corruption standards. Modeling commitment as a function of the nature of the firm's business activities and conditioned by neighborhood and audience contexts, we investigate adherence to the principles entailed in the UN Global Compact program by the world's 2000 largest companies. Our results suggest that the decisions to participate in and to take steps to comply with the Global Compact are influenced by the characteristics of the firm as it adapts to its institutional and political environment. Signing up to the program increases the likelihood of firms developing human rights-related company policies and receiving positive external assessments of their performance.
        Export Export
2
ID:   120130


When do politicians listen to lobbyists (and who benefits when / Bernhagen, Patrick   Journal Article
Bernhagen, Patrick Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract This article provides an empirical test of an informational model of lobbying. The model predicts when lobbyists provide useful information to policy makers and when policy makers follow lobbyists' advice. The predictions are assessed against data on the policy positions and lobbying activities of firms and other organised groups in the context of 28 policy proposals advanced by United Kingdom governments between 2001 and 2007. The results suggest that the interactions between policy makers and lobbyists are driven mainly by the expected policy costs for policy makers, providing lobbyists with strong incentives to provide correct advice to policy makers. There is little support for the expectation that lobbyists can successfully persuade policy makers to take a course of action that is beneficial to the lobbyist at the expense of wider constituencies.
        Export Export