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| 1 |
ID:
025847
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| Publication |
London, BT Batsford, 1979.
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| Description |
256p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0713419660
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 018711 | 956.94/ROT 018711 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
122052
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the description and analysis of Operation Nickel Grass - the American airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The lessons learned from this venture had a decisive impact on subsequent American political and strategic planning policies globally and especially vis-à-vis the Middle East. Furthermore, and just as crucial, it totally transformed US-Saudi relations. The object lessons of this important Cold War big power confrontation and its long-range impact on US-Middle East relations are at the core of this study.
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| 3 |
ID:
118308
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The assumption that the United States operates from a position of strength relative to its potential enemy underpins U.S. deterrence theory. This perceived strength has emboldened American administrations to take serious tactical risks, such as the positioning of aircraft carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 1973 Yom Kippur War in order to dissuade Soviet intervention in that conflict. This tacit assumption, facilitated and entrenched by overwhelming U.S.conventional military superiority in the post-Cold War era, forms the foundation both for the relatively recent developmentof tailored deterrence and for the "Flexible Deterrence Options" (FDO) that now constitute a routine aspectof the joint military planning process. This article argues that the tacit assumption of strength is too narrow and can promote the implementation of deterrent policies and actions that have the opposite effects of those intended. Deterrence, rightly understood, is a component of a conflict management strategy which implies a degree of weakness on the part of the statethat employs it. This condition must be recognized and then incorporated into policies and plans for deterrence.
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| 4 |
ID:
101820
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article deals with Golda Meir, who was a prominent leader of Israel and the Prime Minister during the Yom Kippur War (1973). Its main points are:
Her road towards the national leadership during the "Yishuv" period.
Her political role under David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol as Minister of Labor (1949-1956) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1956-1966)
Meir as political leader: the way she lead her party and how she was a symbol of the national agreement
Meir as diplomatic leader: her attitude during the negotiation attempt with Egypt (The Secretary of the State's Plan - 1970 ; Moshe Dayan's intention to open the Suez Canal - 1971)
Meir as social leader: the strengthening of the welfare - state
Meir during the Yom Kippur War: The War as a result of her policy; Her leadership during the crisis
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| 5 |
ID:
027154
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| Publication |
Dehra Dun, Natraj Publishers, 1984.
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| Description |
xiv, 370p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 022368 | 956.048/OBA 022368 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
122049
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article follows the last 72 hours of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War; that is, the three days from the collapse of the first ceasefire, on 23 October, until 25 October, when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, which ended the war, was adopted. The goal is to present and analyse the interests of the United States and how it managed its policy vis-à-vis Israel and Egypt during the ceasefire imbroglio. However, the article devotes special attention to the serious crisis with the Soviet Union that played out during those fateful hours. It stemmed from the note sent by the leader of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, to US President Richard M. Nixon on 24 October. From the contents of the message, senior American decision-makers concluded that the Soviets were planning the unilateral deployment of an armed force to the Middle East. In response to this threat, these officials decided to raise the state of alert of the American armed forces to Level 3. The main conclusion of the research, however, is that no real Soviet threat existed. On the contrary, the Soviet Union was interested in preserving détente and in continuing to cooperate with the United States in order to put an end to the violence in the Middle East.
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| 7 |
ID:
028088
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| Publication |
New Delhi, English Book Store, 1980.
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| Description |
xi, 514p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 022370 | 956.048/SUN 022370 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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