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ID:
101821
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article seeks to estimate the economic costs that Turkey has incurred in the low-level warfare with the Kurdish separatists since 1984. These costs can be divided into direct costs, which are those that are immediately attributable to the conflict, and indirect costs which are its by-products such as forgone investment, the loss of human capital, capital flight and migration. It is estimated that, until the end of 2005, the total cost was $88.1 billion of which $54.2 billion was direct and $33.9 billion indirect cost. These are not unsubstantial sums for a developing economy. Just with the resources expended directly, Turkey could have finished its historically most ambitious development project, the Southeastern Anatolia project, or it could have built 6,000km of motorways which could criss-cross the country more than twice.
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2 |
ID:
158064
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Summary/Abstract |
The Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) was initiated in the 1970s to produce energy and irrigate arid lands through constructing dams and hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and extensive irrigation networks in southeastern Turkey. Over time, the project was expanded to achieve a wider range of goals in different fields and radically transform Southeastern Anatolia Region. It is also widely claimed that GAP was initiated to address the root causes of the Kurdish question in Turkey and that security considerations and political calculations were actually the raison d’être of GAP. However, this supposed link between GAP and the Kurdish question was often established in a simplistic manner and the question how these two have been related – or not – remained largely untangled. This article aims to fill this research gap and examine the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the interrelationship between GAP and the Kurdish question based on diverse primary and secondary data sources. Accordingly, the article identifies and discusses major narratives in which GAP was conceived as a political and strategic ‘anti-Kurdish’ plot; remedy for the conflict; and totally technical non-political project and presents an alternative and more accurate perspective on how to interpret this relationship.
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3 |
ID:
147945
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