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| 1 |
ID:
187256
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| Summary/Abstract |
Belarus’s recent arc offers three wider lessons for winding down the present international crisis over the Russia–Ukraine war and for planning the post-war order. Firstly, highly personalistic rule is prone to error. The flagrancy of Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s electoral rigging ignited popular indignation, and the extreme brutality of the ensuing crackdown fanned popular outrage. Secondly, and paradoxically, autocracy is strong. Lukashenka’s tight control over all institutions of the state enabled him to prevent elites from defecting or losing the will to resist. Thirdly, ambiguities and compromises are unstable, and must sooner or later give way to clarifying choices. The post-war order must embed decisive outcomes, not unsustainable compromises. The West’s challenge is to enmesh a stable Ukraine in a wider peace that, for the third time in a century, builds a durable security order in Europe.
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| 2 |
ID:
126333
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2013.
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Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin's visit to Britain in April 1956 was the first by the new Soviet leadership to a Western bloc country after Josef Stalin's death. It presented British policy-makers with a unique opportunity for insight and discussion. However, British self-deception regarding their scope for independent action as well as excessive focus on events in the Middle East hampered efforts to build a rapport with Khrushchev and Bulganin. This analysis explores the planning and conduct of what turned out to be a fruitless diplomatic initiative. The visit illustrates British and Soviet policy at the time, as well as Britain's already clear position as the junior partner in the Anglo-American "special relationship" on the eve of Suez.
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| 3 |
ID:
122797
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| Publication |
2013.
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In 1957, Nikita Khrushchev initiated a reorganisation of economic administration in the Soviet Union that became known as the Sovnarkhoz reform. The reform had a major impact on the perception of the role of the republic-level authorities in the system. It also put to the test the ability of central managers and planners to consider alternative ways of administering industry. The article examines the experience of the Ukrainian republic-level authorities in the most crucial aspect of the reform, management of resources, paying particular attention to the controversies related to control of inter-republic deliveries.
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| 4 |
ID:
188808
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From North Korea to Ukraine to Iran, the spectre of nuclear war continues to loom over global affairs. In his timely history Nuclear Folly, Harvard historian Serhii Plokhy takes a fresh and intentionally international look at one of the most fraught moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis. Contrary to the conventional view that US president John F. Kennedy brilliantly out-foxed his inept Soviet counterpart, Nikita Khrushchev, Plokhy posits that both sides repeatedly erred and misread each other – greatly increasing the likelihood of mutual annihilation. Plokhy draws lessons from the crisis for contemporary decision-makers, noting that the power to wield nuclear weapons still resides in a small number of hands.
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| 5 |
ID:
183255
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The Soviet Union was formally replaced by the Russian Federation on 25 December 1991. Americans felt they had won the Cold War. Russians felt an angry sense of humiliation. The Soviet potential for collapse had become visible after Josef Stalin died in 1953. It was not corrected by the Soviet leadership nor picked up by Western governments, and it was masked by Soviet military and international success. But eventually the Soviet leadership could no longer ignore the growing crisis. They appointed Mikhail Gorbachev to find a remedy. He failed. His eventual successor, Vladimir Putin, used force to restore Russia’s role abroad, but ran an increasingly brutal and corrupt regime at home. Russians had hoped that Russia might become prosperous and stable, on good terms with its neighbours. Though that hope was much diminished by Christmas 2021, a flicker nevertheless remained.
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| 6 |
ID:
121706
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2013.
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In the modern age, U.S. presidents have delivered dozens of addresses on international peace and security, but few have been as profound or consequential as John F. Kennedy's "Strategy of Peace" address delivered 50 years ago on June 10 on the campus of American University in Washington.
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| 7 |
ID:
101995
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2010.
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AT THE BEGINNING OF 2003, I was lucky enough to prepare and open an exhibition of paintings called "The Russian Collection" at the National Gallery of Indonesia in Jakarta. It was timed to President of the Indonesian Republic Mrs. Megawati Sukarnoputri's visit to Russia.
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| 8 |
ID:
186400
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How securely did Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handle secret intelligence? Former Soviet officials have claimed that he carelessly revealed intelligence and certainly in conversations with American, Italian, and Iranian diplomats and ministers Khrushchev put at risk Soviet sources by boasting about intelligence successes and disclosing information that could only have come from intelligence. While Soviet officials appear to have overestimated the security impact of Khrushchev’s revelations, he may have compromised a covert KGB mission in Iran and an important surveillance operation against the American embassy in Moscow.
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| 9 |
ID:
102826
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
SOVIET LEADER Nikita Khrushchev's promise "We'll bury you!" has remained unfulfilled, thank God: America the Beautiful lives on and prospers. His son, Sergei, who has become an American citizen, can now reap the benefits of American civilization. His three-volume reminiscences of his father have appeared in Russian not long ago. This is a herculean work:
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| 10 |
ID:
153505
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This article examines the conflict between traditional Marxist attitudes toward war and the problem of the nuclear revolution. It shows how the advent of the nuclear revolution in the 1950s undermined traditional Marxist-Leninist concepts of war, and then goes on to argue that this development must be placed at the centre of contemporary Marxian IR if it is to have explanatory power in the twenty-first century. To make this case directly, it engages with Justin Rosenberg’s revival of Trotsky’s idea of uneven and combined development and its subsidiary law of ‘the whip of external necessity’, and argues that the whip can remain salient today only if one accepts the political utility of nuclear war. The impasse created by the nuclear revolution, it concludes, points Marxist IR in the direction of classic Marxist visions of supranationalism and human unity.
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